Friday, May 31, 2013

SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY Chapter 31: Indira Gandhi - a casualty of terror

SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY
Chapter 31: Indira Gandhi - a casualty of terror 

By K T Rajasingham

In January 1984, the leadership of the Tamil United Liberation Front called for a unity conference in Madras, Tamil Nadu, in India. The invitations were signed by A Amirthalingham, the Secretary General of TULF, and sent to all the militant groups, including the LTTE, TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF and EROS. The day before the conference, it became clear that none of the militant organizations would show up. Therefore, the conference was called off with a face-saving argument that Amirthalingham and others of the TULF were to go to Colombo.

The Tamil United Liberation Front gradually became a spent force in the eyes of the young Tamil militant organizations and Amirthalingham began to lose the luster he had enjoyed as the leader of the Tamils. The party began to lose its representative nature too. It became abundantly clear that without the participation of militant youths the TULF had lost its leadership role.

In the fast changing political environment, the TULF, successor to the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi, even after losing its position as a middle class, moderate parliamentary party, continued to play the role of an election organization and not that of a political party to lead and liberate the Tamils.

In reality, the TULF should have led the Tamil militants in their quest for a separate state for Tamils, according to the mandate they had sought and received in the 1977 parliamentary general elections. When Tamil youths were caught up in the violence unleashed by the state and numerous state machineries, the TULF continued with a strategy of non-violence and negotiation, without any pragmatic approach, even after the Tamil peoples' verdict for the creation of a Tamil state.

Tamil youths began to boldly extend their challenge to the government's violence. "This youth violence opened up a new dimension in Tamil politics ushering a new revolutionary epoch in the historical struggle of a nation of people for political independence." Towards Liberation by Anton S Balasingham, pages 43-44

Indeed, the TULF became a woeful irritant for the entire Tamil militant organization which felt that the TULF leadership had advocated the same political culture for the past 30 years, without any worthy political benefits. They felt that negotiations with the Sinhalese leadership were of no benefit to Tamils. They were determined to gain political mileage through a revolutionary struggle and through armed resistance in the very language the government leadership would understand.

Educated Tamil youths took a keen interest in the activities of the Tamil militant organizations. They came forward to join in their hundreds. Students in the universities contributed to the militant activities. The dedication of the Tamil students was such that they even left their academic careers and joined the militant organizations. Gradually, Tamil political leadership passed into the hands of the militants. Thus the TULF became a shadow, a relic of the past. Though the militants wrested political leadership from the TULF, their exposure to politics was not equal to the heavyweight approach of the Sri Lankan and Indian governments.

As the peace talks in Colombo were getting nowhere, Amirthalingham became increasingly pessimistic over the whole exercise. He threatened to resort to non-cooperation with the government. Meanwhile, President Jayewardene declared that the TULF had lost its hold in the northeast and disputed its ability to control the Tamil militants.

By the end of 1983, university students in Jaffna staged a hunger strike against the government's inaction to provide facilities for the university. According to Adele Balasingham's account in her The Will to Freedom, "I was informed by Mr Pirapakaran that I would have some company soon, as four girls would be coming to Chennai from Jaffna. But although these four young women were sympathetic to the struggle, none were coming to India specifically for military training by the LTTE. Mr Pirabakaran's lieutenants had rescued these women from death when they were engaged in a hunger strike at the Jaffna University in protest against the lack of education facilities for Tamil students.

"Mr Pirabakaran was concerned about the well being of these four women students, now without family and friends, and decided they were to be accommodated with us in our 'secret' residence in Thiruvanmyur when they came from Jaffna. Under direct responsibility of Mr Pirabakaran and with Bala and I, being a married couple, living with us was seen as the best socio-cultural situation for the young women. But although their coming to Chennai and immediately into contact with the leader of the LTTE was not based on any conception of 'feminism' or women's involvement in struggle, these girls - Mathy, Vinoja, Jeya and Lalitha - created unintended minor revolution in the organization." - page 78.

Adele Balasingham further explains, as time progressed, how Prabakaran came to know these young women more closely and it became clear that he had developed a special liking for one of them, Mathy or Mathivathani from Pungudutivu. "We were not surprised when we learned of this relationship, because Mathy was not only a beautiful young woman, but she is exceptionally gentle and caring, living a pious life according to the moral dictates of the Hindu religion. Mathy, who caused a revolution in Mr Pirabakaran, and, by implication, the movement, was a student of agriculture science when she was whisked away from the site of the student demonstration in Jaffna into history." The Will to Freedom - page 80.

P Nedumaran, who was the first to write Pirabakaran - a biography in Tamil, as far as 1988, writes that Mathivathany was from Punguduthievu and her father's name was Earambu and her mother's Mrs Sinnammal, and they are not from Prabakaran's caste.

Adele in her book narrates, "Since Mr Pirabakaran's relationship with Mathy was in contravention of the organization's code of conduct, he was aware that he would meet with severe criticism, even resentment amongst his cadres. Mr Pirabakaran turns to Bala for help in not only defending this relationship to the leaders and cadres in the organization, but by providing a courtship opportunity for the couple.

"Mr Pirabakaran's senior and closest cadres were called to Chennai from Jaffna and informed of his romantic relationship with Mathy and the probable marriage in the near future. Some of the senior cadres who had renounced their love relationships to abide by the code of conduct of the organization were not pleased with their leader's romantic love. Bala explained that the old moral code of the organization was rigid and puritanical and had to be changed to keep abreast with the time. He also argued that romance and heroism were values upheld in Tamil culture. Mr Pirabakaran's love relationship had the potential to revolutionize the organization by making available to the cadres the possibility of a fulfilling love relationship, marriage and family life for them also in the future." - page 81.

Details of the romance and marriage of Prabakaran with Mathivathany were, until recently, simply rumored, as no authoritative and authentic picture emerged, but Adele Balasingham has now revealed the details in her book. According to Adele, the marriage took place at Murugan Temple, Thiruporur, Madras on October 1, 1984. A son was born to them and named after a close confidante of Prabakaran, Charles Anthony Seelan, one of the earliest LTTE cadres to die in confrontation with the Sri Lankan army. A daughter, Thwaraha, was born soon after and given the name of Mathivathany's bodyguard, who had died in a military operation in Jaffna. The third child was born 10 years later and bears the name of Mathivathany's younger brother, an LTTE cadre killed by the Indian army - Balachandran.

Meanwhile, on the government front, after 1983 July riots, the Sri Lankan president sent his brother H W Jayewardene on a mission to countries in Asia, including Australia, to rally opinion against the Eelam demands of the TULF and against Tamil militants and India. He visited Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. He managed to get the leaders of these countries to criticize and condemn the Eelam demand put forward by the TULF and backed with violence by the Tamil militants. Only China came up with an indirect criticism of India - "The big must not bully the small."

J R Jayewardene also sent his foreign minister, A C S Hameed to the United States for military help. America refused to get involved directly, instead it requested Malaysia, Pakistan and Bangladesh provide help to Sri Lanka.

Following the visits of H W Jayewardene and A C S Hameed, J R Jayewardene went on a state visit on June 14, 1984 to five countries - China, Japan, South Korea, the US and the United Kingdom.

On May 20, the Sri Lankan president met Chinese President Li Xian Nan. At this meeting, according to reports, Jayewardene had told him, "In the 2,500-year history of Sri Lanka, we have been invaded, but we never gave in. The spirit of the man was unconquerable. He will fight. Fifteen million people will die unconquered if we are invaded."

Li said, "There are some twisted people who talk of invasion, but China was sure that Sri Lanka could manage her problem." Jayewardene said, "China is an encouragement to small countries like Sri Lanka."

Jayewardene also met Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Zi Yang, who said, "No foreign country has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. We firmly support your endeavor to protect your integrity and independence. We are glad to note that there is an improvement in the internal situation in Sri Lanka. We have no doubt that under your leadership you will find a equitable solution to the problems in your country. Once again I wish to reiterate our manifested position that China stands with Sri Lanka in promoting the integrity and independence as well as the sovereignty of Sri Lanka."

Jayewardene responded, "There are many projects in which you have assisted Sri Lanka in and all these projects have been fruitful to our country. The position of our internal security causes considerable problem for us and here again you have been helpful to us in the gifting of six patrol boats for our navy. We would like some more of these boats because they are useful in interdicting illegal immigration and also terrorist activities in the North." The Chinese premier agreed to help Sri Lanka on this sphere.

When Jayewardene met Deng Xiaoping, the strongman, the chairman of the Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, Jayewardene appealed for the same request of patrol boats, "Provide some gun boats to protect us from the terrorists, as you have done in the past, which will help us to prevent illegal immigration from the Indian coast which is only 20 miles away from our Northern boundary."

Though the Chinese president and prime minister spoke about the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of Sri Lanka, there was no doubt that secret talks were conducted about the supply of arms. China began to supply arms to Sri Lanka after the visit of H W Jayewardene, in September 1983. China very strongly indicated when the Sri Lankan president visited that it opposed any foreign interference, as well as the partitioning of the country. After the president's visit, a delegation of Chinese air force officers visited Colombo in July 1984 and Lalith Athulathmudali, the Minister for National Security, visited China in July 1985.

Jayewardene's visit to United States was arranged along with state visits to China, South Korea and Japan. Apart from Jayewardene's call on Ronald Reagan at the White House, at the customary speech on the South lawn, the Sri Lankan president presented a baby elephant to the American president. Jayewardene discussed the possibility of American military assistance to fight Tamil militancy. On June 18, on the request of Reagan, the Sri Lankan pPresident explained the background of the ethnic conflict to George Bush, the vice president, George Shultz, the Secretary of State, Donald Regan, the Treasury Secretary and to M Peter McPherson, USAID administrator.

At a breakfast meeting hosted by Katherine Graham, chairman of the Washington Post, on June 19, the Sri Lankan president said:

"We cannot carry out a political campaign in the Tamil-speaking areas. So we must eliminate terrorism. I do not care what India thinks, we have to maintain our unity and stability. A discredited politician whom Mrs Gandhi did not like, M Karunanidhi, the former Chief Minister, is trying to come back to power through the Sri Lankan Tamil problem. The present Chief Minister, Mr M G Ramachandran, who was a good friend of Sri Lanka, but as a result of this, is now trying to out do Karunanidhi. Our complaint is that the Tamil Nadu government is helping terrorists. It has become an internal political issue for them. They, the terrorists, want to create a Marxist state. I have no proof of Soviet involvement. As for India, why do they not take a more helpful attitude. What I am saying to Mrs Gandhi is that the terrorists come secretly into Sri Lanka from South India. I want to ask Mrs Gandhi not to encourage the different terrorist groups to get together and not to give hem assistance."

While in America, the Sri Lankan president met Charles Z Wick, the director of the United States Information Agency and discussed the Voice of America's radio station in Chilaw, Sri Lanka. Jayewardene, prior to his departure, had sanctioned 250 acres of land to for the VOA station. The groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the technically-advanced broadcasting station was scheduled for September 1984.

It seems that, during the president's visit to US, some form of a base facility for the US Navy was discussed and agreed to, but later he denied this. Apart from the president's visit, Prime Minister Premadasa and Lalith Athulathmudali, Minister for National Security, also visited America, separately, to procure military assistance. It is believed that the arms supplied by Pakistan, China and Singapore to Sri Lanka were actually from the US, which did not wish to be seen to be directly involved. It was reported that at least 100 gunboats and 50 helicopter gunships were supplied by the US through Pakistan and China.

On his way back to Sri Lanka, Jayewardene visited New Delhi and met Indira Gandhi. She asked him why the Regional Councils could not be granted. Jayewardene replied, "I cannot carry the people with me on that. We, as a party, will lose the entire base, if we give this." He also said that terrorism by the Tamil militants was making the Sinhala people adopt a harder stand.

India accused Jayewardene of going back on his word on granting autonomy to the Tamils. On June 28, the LTTE in a statement said about the TULF, "Ignoring us [LTTE] and having negotiations with the TULF cannot have any impact as the confrontation would continue, if in case, any settlement reached with the TULF is not satisfactory from the point of view of our struggle." On the same day, a powerful bomb planted by EROS exploded in the Lanka Oberoi Hotel, located in Colombo, killing a woman employee.

Amirthalingham was seen as a prisoner of circumstances and could not commit his party towards any form of political solution in the sharply deteriorating political circumstances. In the meanwhile, in a bid to recover lost ground politically, he announced a day of mourning, fasting and prayer to mark the first anniversary of the 1983 July anti-Tamil program. The fast was to be held on July 25, 1984, at Veeramakaliamman temple in Jaffna.

M Sivasithamparam, the president of the TULF, in explaining the need to observe the fast on that day, said, "It is now patent that no political solution acceptable to the Tamil people will ever be worked out at the APC. The Tamil people in their overwhelming numbers have placed their faith in us to win their rights. This is a sacred task of us. We have tried to do our duty in different ways. We have tried dialogues; we have tried bi-partite talks; we have tried persuasion in parliament; we have canvassed world opinion. But all have proved fruitless. Mahatma Gandhi has shown a way of action to the weak of the world. We shall go along that path on July 25. We shall be truesatyagrahis. But if this causes sufferings to the Tamils, we offer ourselves as the first to suffer."

The Tamil militants branded the satyagraha and the day of mourning, intended to be adhered by the TULF, as a farce and said only force would work. They said, "All your policy of cooperation and dialogue has failed and we strongly believe that only force will yield results." They distributed leaflets, urging the public not to participate in the TULF campaign.

Tamil militants exploded bombs at the proposed venue, on July 25, very early in the morning to scare people away from participating. When Amirthalingham, Sivasithamparam and other TULF stalwarts came to the temple at 7am, there were a handful of volunteers, and the number grew by about 200 as the day went on. But about 300 young men who congregated around the satyagrahis began to heckle and abuse the TULF leaders. This was something new to Amirthalingham. Normally, he was the one who organized such heckling campaign to break down the anti-TULF meetings. But now he was the target.

The young men asked many embarrassing questions. They asked, "Where were you all these days?" "Were you not having a comfortable life in India, leaving the Tamils in the country to face the Sinhalese army all alone?" They further asked, "Do you want the Tamil people to be deceived by the Sinhala politicians over and over again?" A few of them asked very pointedly, "We the Tamils elected you as our representatives with the mandate for a separate state of Tamil Eelam. But, what you have done? Who asked you to take up the post of the leader of the opposition? If you find that it was impossible for you people to work toward a separate state for the Tamils, why you did not resign your membership in the parliament?" When Amirthalingham and Sivasithamparan tried to reply, they were not allowed to speak. The youths said, "You all have spoken enough and we have heard it enough. Now it is time for the people to speak and let them speak."

As the heckling continued, a majority of the hunger strikers sensed the mood and gradually left the venue. Then the youths began to distribute food parcels. When a small section of the youths came forward to force-feed Amirthalingham and Sivasithamparam, they were prevented by another section of Tamils youths.

By noon, only 18 people, including the leaders of the TULF, were seen fasting despite the comical circus staged by the Tamil youths. They called off the fast two hours before the schedule when a powerful bomb was detonated in the vicinity.

Meanwhile, the TELO called for a two-day strike to mark the first anniversary of the death of their founding leaders - Thangathurai and Kuttimani. All shops, schools and other institutions were closed in the Tamil-dominated regions of Jaffna, Killinocchchi, Mullaithievu, Vavuniya, Mannar, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. The strike paralyzed the life in those regions.

Posters were pasted all over calling for the remembrance of Thangathurai - Tamil Eelam - National Father. Nadarajah Thangathurai was one of the first Tamil freedom fighters to be captured by the Sri Lanka government. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on February 24, 1983. On March 1, 1983, he made a statement from the dock which to this day remains one of the best testaments to Tamil sentiments in Sri Lanka. (The full text of his speech is given at the end of this chapter as an annex.)

Meanwhile, an announcement in The Guardian, a British newspaper, appeared on July 28, 1984, with the headline "Remembering the July 1983 violence against Tamils" signed by 80 Members of the British parliament. The announcement read as follows, "The ethnic violence which erupted in Sri Lanka in July 1983 brought untold misery to the Tamils. They were beaten, hacked and burnt to death in a frenzy of racial hatred. Their houses and businesses were selectively looted and destroyed. The Sri Lankan government had admitted that the violence was pre-planned and well organized and that even sections of the security forces joined the attacks against the Tamils. Fifty-three Tamil detainees held in a maximum security prison in Colombo were brutally killed on July 25 and 27. Yet, to date, no impartial inquiry into these violent attacks has taken place.

"Amnesty International [AI] recently reported a number of cases of extrajudicial killings and secret disposal of bodies without inquest or post mortem. The AI and the International Commission of Jurists [ICJ] have also reported on a number of cases of torture and death in custody, of persons detained Incommunicado for periods of up to 18 months under the Sri Lankan Prevention of Terrorism Act. No legislation conferring remotely comparable powers is in force in any other free democracy ... such a provision is an ugly blot on the statue book of any civilized country.

"The sixth amendment to the constitution virtually disenfranchised the country's 3 million Tamils by reason of the ban imposed on their political parties. This amendment according to the ICJ, 'constitutes a clear violation by Sri Lanka of its obligations in international law'. The 1 million Tamils working in the tea plantations, who were deprived of nationality, citizenship and franchise in 1948 continue to remain stateless persons.

"We are of the opinion that: 

  • "An impartial international commission should be set up to inquire into the violence against the Tamils in July 1983, including the killing of 53 Tamil detainees held in custody by the government.
  • "The Prevention of Terrorism Act should be repealed and the powers given to the security forces which facilitate arbitrary killing of civilians and disposal of their bodies without inquest or post-mortem should be rescinded.
  • "The use of torture and incommunicado detention in violation of Sri Lanka's obligations under International Covenants should be discontinued.
  • "The rights of nationality, citizenship and franchise to the Tamils working in the plantations should be restored.

  • "The Sri Lankan government should repeal the sixth amendment to the constitution and take meaningful steps to arrive at a political solution to the country's ethnic problem by the granting of the legitimate rights of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka."

    Signed by: David Alton MP, Paddy Ashdown MP, Norman Atkinson MP, Tony Banks MP, Prof John Barrett, Kevin Barron MP, Gerry Berningham MP, Alan Beith MP, Sydney Bidwell MP, Prof Tom Bottomore, Malcolm Bruce MP, Dale Campbell-Savours MP, Dennis Canavan MP, Alex Carlile MP, Tom Clarke MP, Bob Clay MP, Anne Clwyd MP, Harry Cohen MP, Jerome Corbyn MP, Ron Davis MP, Eric Deakins MP, Alf Dubs MP, Prof Michael Dummett, Darek Fatchett MP, Mark Fishery MP, Martin Flannery MP, Michael Foot MP, Roy Hattersley MP, Simon W H Hughes MP, Lord Jenkins, Russell Johnston MP, Robert Kilroy-Silk MP, Ted Knight, Sir David Lane, Terry Lewis MP, Bob Litherland MP, Ken Livingstone, Tony Lloyd MP, Weddle Loyden MP, Max Madden MP, Joan Maynard MP, Willie Mckelvey MP, Bill Michle MP, Dr Paul Noone, Bob Perry MP, Alan Roberts MP, Ernia Roberts MP, Allan Roberts MP, Aubrey Rose, Ernie Ross MP, Steven Ross MP, Clare Short MP, Dennis Skinner MP, Prof Peter Townsend, Jim Wallace MP, Garath Werdell MP, Dafydd Wigley MP, and many others.

    Meanwhile, a tragic drama unfolded on August 2, 1984, at the Meenambakam international airport, located in Madras, Tamil Nadu. A passenger named Kathiresan, checked in two bags to Colombo but as the bags were excess in weight, the passenger paid excess charges and the two suitcases were tagged to MAA-CMB-Madras-Colombo. This meant that the passenger's intention was to fly from Madras by an Air Lanka flight to Colombo. But after check-in, the suitcases were tampered with and the tags were changed to send them to Charles De Gaulle airport in Paris and the another to London's Gatwick.

    However, the bags were never loaded onto these flights and they were taken to the left baggage counter. It appears that Kathiresan was watching events and he panicked, and he frantically telephoned Madras airport authorities, warning them about the suitcases. No one took the calls seriously, believing it was a hoax. But when he called for a third time the duty officer took it seriously and arranged to remove the suitcases. But at 22:52 a massive blast occurred, killing six men and 24 women. Eighteen of the women were Sri Lankans returning from Gulf countries who were waiting in the Madras transit lounge for a flight to Colombo.

    M G Ramachandran, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, blamed "cruel-minded persons" for the blast. Indira Gandhi informed the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, "I condemned the outrage as much as you do." Tamil groups in Madras immediately blamed the Sri Lankan government and Israel's intelligence agency Mossad for the attack.

    It became clear that the bombs were timed to go off at Colombo International Airport. Tamil Nadu police did not think in terms of the Tamil groups in Madras. According to K Mohandas, the director general of police, Tamil Nadu, "The first major danger signal was a bomb blast in Madras airport on the night of August 2, 1985, [The year is wrong - it is 1984 and not 1985.] which killed 30 persons. There was a disinformation campaign, including planted stories in obliging newspapers, to the effect that the blast was the work of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, with the view to discredit the Tamil militants, at the behest of the Sri Lankan government. The story was put into my ears even officially. But the Crime Branch/CID sleuths, working overtime under my direction, detected the case within a week. The investigation revealed that it was the work of a small group called, TEA [Tamil Eelam Army]. Involved in the conspiracy were: (1) The TEA Chief, "Panagoda" Maheswaran [so-called, because of his daring escape from the maximum security prison at Panogoda, in Sri Lanka] who was a chemical engineering graduate from London University.] [Actually he was a university drop-out]; (2) Vigneswara Raja, [Vigneswararajah of Thunnalai, Karaveddy] retired collector of customs in Sri Lanka; (3) Thambi Rajah [It should have to be Thambirajah], a Sri Lankan national [from Batticaloa]; (4) Vijayakumar; (5) Loganathan both of whom were Indian nationals working for Air Lanka; and (6) Chandrakumar, a police constable attached to the airport police station.

    "The objective of the conspirators was, however, not to blast the Madras Airport, but to plant the time bomb on an Air Lanka plane leaving Madras for Colombo, with the timing so adjusted as to have the bomb exploded in Colombo airport. Vigneswara Rajah, Thambi Rajah, Vijayakumar, Loganathan and Chandrakumar were arrested immediately while Maheswaran absconded.

    "From a suburban house in Madras, a similar timing device was seized, apart from 100 kilograms f gelatin sticks, detonator wires, chemicals like red phosphorous and sodium metal, crystal capacitors, 1 kg potassium cyanide and currency worth Rs2 lakhs [both Indian and foreign]. It was apparent that the time bomb used at the airport was manufactured in this house, and this was corroborated by the arrest of Sri Lankan nationals." M G R: The Man and The Myth by K Mohandas, pages 117 to 118.

    Colombo accused India of harboring, training and arming Tamil militants. The Sri Lankan government made full use of the incident to accuse India and the TULF.

    Meanwhile, New Delhi summoned the Tamil Nadu police director general Mohandas for discussions about the case. With the Chief Minister's approval, he went to Delhi. According to Mohandas' account, "I presented myself before the senior policy maker and his constitutional adviser in New Delhi, the next day. It was the latter who did most of the talking. Beating round the bush, he indirectly indicated that we had a duty to protect the Sri Lankan militants and that if we continued along the known line of investigation in the airport blast case, the Sri Lankan government would take advantage of it and proclaim to the world the existence of the militant training camps in India which had 'officially been denied' by New Delhi. He added that there was also the danger of the Tamil chauvinist political parties in Tamil Nadu taking advantage of the situation and joining hands with the militants with the objective of establishing a bigger Eelam, including Tamil Nadu." M G R: The Man and The Myth by K Mohandas, pages 118 to 119.

    It was leant later that, the retired customs collector Vigneswararajah jumped bail and took off to New Delhi and managed to acquire a forged passport and landed in London. Mohandas subsequently alleged, "This quick movement would not have been possible without official support. He made broadcasts over the BBC personally accusing me of being insensitive to Tamil sentiments, attributing it to the fact that I was a non-Tamil. The case against him and Maheswaran was split and the remaining four accused were sentenced to life imprisonment. The case against the two absconding accused is still pending. The last I heard was the extradition proceedings had been instituted against them, but this is a time-consuming process." M G R: The Man and The Mythby K Mohandas, pages 119 to 120.

    In the month of August, violence in the Jaffna district escalated. On August 4, for the first time the LTTE attacked a Sri Lankan naval boat off the coast of Valvetiturai, killing six personnel. On August 5, Tigers (LTTE) attacked a police station at Mullaithievu, killing two policemen. According to a government communique, several LTTE cadres were also killed, but the militants managed to acquire four machine guns and 20 rifles and a large amount of ammunition when they fled after the attack.

    On August 8, a group of militants belonging to the TELO faction attacked a police station at Chunnakam. Firing went on until the next day, the 9th. On the 10th, authorities decided to abandon the Chunnakam police station and the policemen there packed their things and left. Curious civilians entered the abandoned the two-storey building on the Jaffna-Kankesanthurai Road. Suddenly, a massive explosion ripped through the building and nearly 20 people died instantaneously, and 30 more were injured. It was later reported that Inspector S Rajalingham, a Tamil, who was the officer in charge of the police station, before abandoning the station, set up a time bomb on the ground floor.

    Meanwhile, J Herath, the Superintendent of Police, Vavuniya, was killed by a time bomb and the security forces hit back by killing 22 suspected militants in the Jaffna peninsula.

    According to an Amnesty International report for 1985, "The government stated on November 17 that between January 1977 to October 31, 1984, 96 members of the armed services and 182 civilians had been killed by the Tamil extremist groups. Dozens more such deaths were reported later in the year."

    According to another report, the Tamil militants had murdered 167 civilians, 13 politicians, 55 police personnel, 34 army personnel, three navy personnel and four air force personnel. In August 1984 the orgy of violence continued unabated. On August 11, six army men died in Mannar when their jeep hit a land mine. The soldiers retaliated and the Mannar Roman Catholic Bishop complained, "It is like an army of occupation flattening everything in its path."

    Against the killing in the Jaffna peninsula, on August 13 hundreds of students in Madras took to the streets protesting against innocent Tamils being killed in Sri Lanka. The Tamil Nadu government, sensing the mood, closed down schools for a week. TULF leaders appealed to Indira Gandhi to "intervene and save millions of Tamils in Sri Lanka from total extinction in the hand of the Sri Lankan armed forces".

    On August 15, on a nationwide address, Indira Gandhi said that India could not remain silent in the wake of the killings. But while the military offensive continued the TULF reversed its stand and decided to attend the renewed All Party Conference convened by J R Jayewardene.

    The All Party Conference met on August 17. Premadasa, who headed the Committee on Devolution, presented his committee's report and said that it had left the question of the unit of the devolution open. Again the plenary session met on September 3. Amirthalingham flatly rejected both district and provincial councils and insisted on the regional council proposal. "If the regional council request is denied," Amirthalingham cautioned, "then the TULF has no option but to carry on its struggle for the liberation of the Tamil people, for the preservation of the integrity of the traditional homeland and for justice and human rights by all non-violent means". Kumar Ponnampalam of the Tamil Congress and S Thonadaman, the Minister and the leader of the Ceylon Workers Congress, backed the regional council demand.

    Meanwhile, the LTTE announced that it was switching over its war tactics from hit and run to a new phase of a sustained guerilla campaign. Again, on September 1, 1984, five police commandos died in an explosion at Thikkam, a coastal village in Point Pedro. Enraged army colleagues set fire to shops at the Point Pedro market square, which was located three miles east of Thikkam village, and attacked pedestrians. Two days later, a Sri Lankan Navy patrol shot and killed eight fishermen on a fishing boat off the coast of East Point Pedro. On September 9, nine soldiers were killed and four wounded when their convoy was blasted by a landmine at Kokilai, located nearly 15 kilometers from Mullaithievu.

    Amnesty International in its 1985 annual report rightly pointed out, "During 1984 there were increasing reports of unarmed Tamil civilians being deliberately shot dead in reprisal for attacks by Tamil extremist groups on security forces personnel."

    The Sri Lankan security forces began to take cold-blooded revenge on Tamil civilians when, on September 11, a private bus from Colombo on its way to Jaffna, which halted at a tea shop in Vavuniya town, was intercepted by a group of army men from the Vavuniya camp. They hijacked the bus to a lonely jungle spot on the Vavuniya-Mannar road, near Poovarasankulam, and they shot and killed nearly 28 civilians.

    The known names of those killed were as follows:

    Somalingham Ehathayaparan alias Babu - 28 years old; Ravi Kandasamithurai of Nallur, 23-year-old final year law student; K Sinnathurai from Karaveddy, 60 years old, a driver; N Nazeer of Colombo; Saravanamuthu Thiyagesar of Oddusuddan; M Siva of Colombo; Ratnsabapathy Kirupaharan of Vaddukoddai; Mohamed Jaiyavudeen of Colombo; Sebamalai of Kochchikade, Colombo; Veersaingham Murugiah of Chunnakam; Nadesu Murugavel of Chullipuram; Bernard of Naranthanai, Kayts; S Paramanathan of Uduvil; Sinnathamby Jeyaentharan of Kaithady; S Jeyasingham of Vaddukoddai and E Rajendran, 24 years old.

    Another noteworthy incident happened on October 21. "The next day [October 21] Colombo was rocked by series of blasts - blamed on EROS - which killed three people. The first explosion around 5am, took place near a church, killing a Tamil young man. It was followed by at least nine other explosions in the next three-and-a-half hours, spreading panic in the city. The Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation [SLBC] went on the air at 10am appealing for calm. Explosions were reported from a Colombo suburb where two people were killed when they opened a box lying on the road, the Fort railway station where scores were injured, near the state-owned SLBC and TV stations, near the Home Ministry office and at four other locations. The main bus station also suffered an explosion, while army experts defused a second bomb at a crowded Fort Railway station." Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas by M R Narayan Swamy, pages 133 to 134.

    As the Tamil militants were getting bolder and were growing increasingly intolerant, the fear of possible Indian intervention continued. India's position was mystifying.

    After the 1983 holocaust, India came forward to interfere in Sri Lanka's internal problem - the ethnic conflict. Knowing very well that the Tamils of Sri Lanka had been given a resounding mandate in the 1977 parliamentary general elections for a separate state for Tamils, Indira Gandhi told the TULF leaders that she was against the separation of the country. But at the same time, she arranged the training and arming of Tamil militants, even without the knowledge of the TULF, and maintained an official position that there were no bases of Sri Lankan Tamil militants in India. The reason for adopting such a duplicity, a contradictory posture, was never explained by Indira Gandhi. There remained contradiction between the goals of Indian policy and the means used to achieve those goals.

    India, it was said, was committed to ensure that Sri Lanka did not disintegrate. Indira Gandhi must have been harboring a fear that the emergence of a Tamil Eelam constituting the North and Eastern provinces as a separate state might stimulate and encourage a separatist movement in India, specially among Tamils in Tamil Nadu. There was, by then, already agitation for Khalistan among Sihks in Punjab. There was a school of thought that Indira Gandhi felt that to negotiate with the Sri Lankan government leaders, the Tamils should have to negotiate from a position of strength and power and not in the way earlier adopted by the moderate Tamil political leaders.

    Also, it was explained that though India was not prepared to support a separate state, it trained and armed Tamil militants to defend their Tamil people against the ruthless and brutal attacks of the Sinhala supremacist Sri Lankan army.

    On October 27, the US Secretary of State Richard Murphy visited Sri Lanka. When speaking about the ethnic conflict, he said that it should be solved by the Sri Lankan government and not by outsiders

    On October 31, 1984, Indira Gandhi was shot down while walking from her house to her office in New Delhi. The fatal shooting was carried out by two Sikh men, who were members of her personal bodyguard. The shooting marked an abrupt and tragic end to the lengthy political career of the woman who was not only India's first female prime minister, but also the daughter of the very first prime minister of India. Her assassination was indicative of the deep unrest in India, brutally forcing to the surface problems that had been simmering in the country for decades.

    She was the only surviving child of Pandit Jawaharlal and Kamala Nehru and was born on November 19, 1917. She was educated at various institutions, including Tagore's Santiniketan (1934-35) and Samerville, Oxford (1936-41). She did not had any formal academic degree, but was a voluminous reader and a good speaker. She was married in 1942 to Feroze Gandhi, a Parsee, hailing from the middle class family and no relation to Mahatma Gandhi.

    She took a prominent part in the freedom movement, was baton-charged by the police in 1942 at Lucknow and suffered imprisonment for nine months in 1943. Mother of two sons, Rajiv and Sanjay, she became a widow in 1960.

    Indira Gandhi had a unique practical training in politics and experience of men and affairs, as the president of the Indian National Congress (1959-60) and as the understudy and official hostess of her father Jawaharlal Nehru during his premiership (1947-64) and as the Minister of Information and Broadcasting (1964-65) in Lal Bahadur Shastri's ministry before she was elected by a large majority as the leader of the Congress parliamentary party in 1965, and became the prime minister of India on January 24, 1966.

    Her assassination was directly linked with the Sikh uprising in Punjab state and the subsequent campaign undertaken by the Indian army, code-named "Operation Blue Star". Earlier, frustration began to set in within the Sikh community in Punjab, due to the betrayal and threatening behavior of the Indian government, giving way to a small-scale armed insurgency calling for the implementation of what the Sikhs had been agitating for since India's independence. The leader of this armed movement was a preacher from an orthodox Sikh institution called Damdami Taksal, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Bhindranwale encouraged his followers to arm themselves and fight violence with violence. He took shelter within the Golden Temple complex, and soon emerged as an unchallenged leader of the Sikh movement, with considerable influence, by the early 1980s.

    The Indian government, led by Indira Gandhi, who had once tried to use Bhindranwale against the Sikh political party, Akali Dal, began to infiltrate the ranks of Bhindranwale and orchestrated acts of terrorism across the state of Punjab. Refusing to concede to the modest demands of moderate Sikhs, Indira Gandhi escalated the tension between the Indian government and Bhindranwale by labeling him as a terrorist.

    The climax of the Indian government's campaign against the Sikhs came on June 4, 1984, when the prime minister ordered a full-scale military assault on the Golden Temple complex, where Bhindranwale and a few hundred followers took residence. Over the course of a three-day period, the Indian army pounded the holiest Sikh shrine with tanks, artillery and weapons, later described as a full-scale war. In the Indian government's undeclared war against the Sikhs, a military operation, codenamed "Blue Star", it was alleged that thousands of innocent Sikh devotees trapped in the Golden Temple complex perished. Bhindranwale and a couple hundred of his armed followers died defending the Golden Temple.

    This episode left a permanent wound on the Sikh psyche. After Indira Gandhi was assassinated, it was followed with the massacre of thousands of Sikhs across India by organized criminal mobs. In Delhi, it was again alleged that local politicians directed these mobs to Sikh-owned businesses and homes where innocent Sikhs were beaten, doused with gasoline and burned alive. To this day, no more than a dozen people have even been charged with the murder of an estimated 10,000 Sikhs.

    For the Sikhs, the traumatic events of 1984 prompted a vast majority of them to struggle for full-fledged independence. The movement for a separate Sikh nation, Khalistan; a poorly-organized guerrilla movement, was brutally crushed by the Indian government in 1994. Human rights groups estimated that nearly a quarter of a million Sikhs, mostly innocent people, were killed at the insistence of the Indian government on suspicion of sympathizing with the armed separatists.

    The sudden death of Indira Gandhi had a telling effect among Tamils in Sri Lanka. A general hartal was observed in Tamil areas. Shops, business establishments, schools and other institutions were closed. Black flags were hoisted in almost all Tamil homes. The slain leader was respected among Tamils. Amirthalingham said that Indira Gandhi was, "the only shield the Tamils had against the genocide".

    Gandhi's death removed lot of pressure on the Sri Lankan government. She had died so suddenly, no one was able to grasp her political ideology, she adhered to with regard to the Tamils of Sri Lanka. She did not leave behind a program of action or her political philosophy with regard to the Tamils of Sri Lanka.

    Amirthalingham sent a telegram to Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother as premier, "The Sri Lankan people have lost their mother." In a press statement he said that the Tamils who were in a state of uncertainty were now full of anxiety regarding their future in the absence of the slain leader.

    The Sri Lankan government declared November 3, a public holiday as a mark of respect to the official cremation day of the revered Indian leader. Thousands of Sri Lankans, including Sinhalese, patiently lined up at Indian House - the official residence of the Indian High Commissioner, to pay their last respects.

    According to M R Narayan Swamy, the author of Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas, the Sri Lankan armed forces were happy at the news of the death of Indira Gandhi. He writes that Sri Lankan soldiers danced and were happy that Indira Gandhi was at last dead. "In Jaffna, Sri Lankan soldiers danced in the open on receiving the news of Gandhi's death, taunting Tamil passers-by: Amma Enge? Amma Enge? [Where is your mother? Where is your mother?] Some soldiers also performed baila, a dance of Portuguese origin, on the streets. The grief in Tamil areas was real and intense since Gandhi has been widely seen as a savior vis-a-vis the Sri Lankan government. On the day of her funeral, militants detonated an explosive every 30 minutes. Amirthalingham called Gandhi 'the only shield against genocide', while the Tamil Information Center moaned 'Never since the death of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were the Tamils of Sri Lanka sunk in such genuine grief.' At least 12 girls born in Jaffna in the first five days of November were named Indira." Pages 134 to 135.

    On November 1, 1984, Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as the new prime minister of India. Until the death of Sanjay Gandhi in a plane crash on June 23, 1980, Rajiv had kept himself aloof from politics. On August 12, 1980, he said in an interview with the editor of New Delhi magazine that he would consider entering politics only if he was convinced that it would "genuinely help" his mother. He was thus a reluctant entrant to politics but once he entered the arena, he fully entrenched himself in the world of politics.

    Rajiv Gandhi, born in 1944, served as the prime minister of India from 1984 to 1989. He attended Cambridge University, where he met and married Sonia. He was not a man of any unusual academic achievements or other distinctions, and appears to have had few ambitions until the death of his brother Sanjay in 1980. The following year, his mother appears to have induced Rajiv, an airline pilot, to enter politics. He stood successfully for election in 1981 and became a political adviser to his mother. After her assassination in 1984, Rajiv succeeded her as head of the Congress party, and was sworn in as prime minister of India.

    Rajiv, rather keen on preparing India for the 21st century, collected his buddies and cronies around him and sought to increase Indian investments in modern technology. His "vision" of India, insofar as he had one, was that of a technocrat, and his policies did little to eradicate or diminish poverty and the vast inequities of power and wealth which are to be found in Indian society.

    Rajiv formed his full cabinet on November 4, 1984, and inducted almost all those in his mother's cabinet, a total of 38 ministers. In the parliamentary general elections held in December 1984, the Indian National Congress under Rajiv Gandhi's leadership won overwhelmingly. Amirthalingham and the TULF leaders were quick to congratulate him on succeeding his mother. Thus they tried to re-establish a friendship similar to that which had emerged with Indira Gandhi.

    Adele Balasingham in her The Will to Freedom writes about the new prime minister of India as a novice to politics, and that he could not come to grips with geo-political strategies. "Mrs Gandhi made a bold decision to militarily train and arm the Tamil militant movement to create a powerful force of resistance to compel Jayewardene's regime to adopt a rational political path renouncing the military options. The new Indian prime minister was a novice insofar as the intricate and complex manners in which foreign policy determinations were charted by the wise old lady. The young inexperienced Rajiv could not immediately comprehend the geo-political and strategic motivations behind India's covert involvement in actively assisting Tamil armed resistance in Sri Lanka. His poverty of knowledge with regard to the history of the Tamil political struggle and his lack of understanding of the enormous suffering faced by the oppressed Tamil people led him to adopt a more rigid interventionist policy. Subsequently, Rajiv's administration felt that the time had come to suspend military assistance to the militants and to persuade them to effect a ceasefire and seek a negotiated political settlement to the ethnic conflict." page 92.

    Comments of this nature were written and published in 2001, and this reflected the candid view that prevailed and lingered among the LTTE in those days.

    Meanwhile, on November 19, Colonel A Ariyaperume, the chief of the Northern command, was killed at the Tellipalai junction, Jaffna, when his jeep hit a landmine. On November 20, TELO successfully attacked a police station at Chavakachcheri. A young boy went to the secured entrance of the police station and told the policeman on duty that he wanted to report the loss of his national identity card. When the unsuspecting policeman opened the gate, nearly 35 men in military fatigues, rushed in from across the road, firing their guns. A second group followed them. Meanwhile, a truck loaded with explosion was driven into the police station compound and when the last of the raiders vacated the compound the detonator was set off, igniting tons of explosives, which brought the concrete structure of two-storey police station crashing to the ground.

    Nearly 24 policemen died in the attack, the weapons in the police station was stolen and the entire operation lasted just 15 minutes. After the attack, when army detachments tried to reach Chavakachcheri, the militants set off dozens of land mines, causing huge craters and virtually blocking almost all roads to the devastated police station.

    The attack on the police station was followed by an attack on Sinhalese boarder villages by the LTTE on November 24, 1984. They raided a resettlement farm at Padaviya (Pathavikulam in Tamil) on the border of the Mullaithievu - Vavuniya district - killing some 60 Sinhalese. It was told later that those who were killed were civilians, and it was a most gruesome attack. This was followed by another group of gunmen raiding a second resettlement farm eight kilometers away, where 20 Sinhalese villagers were massacred.

    Those two farms, called Dollar and Kent, had been Tamil-owned before being procured by the Prison Department for the rehabilitation of prisoners. Earlier, after the 1977 riots, plantation workers who were Tamils of Indian origin had settled on the two farms. After the procurement of the farms the government arranged to get rid of the Tamils and settled some 450 Sinhalese ex-convicts on the two farms. It was also later brought out that other than the prisoners to be rehabilitated, there were some Sinhalese settlers from the dry zone. The Tamil militants position was that that these were the places where trained Sinhala ex-convicts were settled to eject the Tamil villagers from the are. The Pathavikulam is considered the heartland of the Tamil Vanni region.

    On November 25, LTTE guerrillas, including women fighters, attacked the two fishing villages of Nayaru and Kokilai in Mullaithievu district, killing 59 Sinhalese civilians. The killing of nearly 120 Sinhalese civilians led to an unprecedented exodus of Sinhalese settlers from areas bordering the embattled northeast, leading to a Sinhalese refugee problem for the first time in Sri Lanka. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam claimed responsibility for the attacks on Kent and Dollar farms.

    Subsequently on December 2, nearly 30 armed soldiers from the Padaviya army camp went to the village of Othiyamalai where they reportedly rounded up and shot 27 Tamils early in the morning in a reprisal for the attack on the Kent and Dollar farms. Othiyamalai is a Tamil village in Nedunkerny in the Mullaithievu district. After the attack the Sri Lankan soldiers took away with them five Tamil men who are still missing.

    According to an Amnesty International Report, it has received detailed accounts from persons who have made statement about the killings. Witness have stated that on the night ofDecember1, 1984, between 30 and 40 soldiers came to the village, camped for the night at Malaikadu Temple, and early in the morning of December 2 entered the village houses and took away one or more men from each, most of them in the 15-35 age group. According to these reports, many had their hands tied behind their backs and were taken, some of them in the trailer of a tractor, to village community centre hall, where 27 male villagers were shortly afterwards shot dead. Five others, all around 50 years of age were said to have been kept apart, put on a trailer of a tractor bearing No: 25 Sri 6511 and are believed to have been shot dead by the same army personnel near the Dollar and Kent farms after having been taken outside the village. Burned bodies have been found, leading to the tentative identification of two of the five men by their clothing.

    The names of those who were shot dead at the Village Community Center, Othiyamalai are as follows:
    Kanapathipillai Chinniah, a 32-year-old farmer with four dependents.
    Kanapathipillai Sivapatham, a 29-year-old farmer with five dependents.
    Kandiah Sivasithamparam, a 34-year-old farmer with five dependents.
    Kandiah Tharmalingham, a 36-year-old farmer with four dependents.
    Kasipillai Selvarasa, a 38-year-old farmer with four dependents.
    Krishnapillai Rajalingham, a 28-year-old farmer with two dependents.
    Krishnapillai Paramalingham, a 30-year-old farmer with six dependents.
    Manickan Mohanadas, a 32-year-old farmer with five dependents.
    Naharatnam Kartheeswaran, a 22-year-old farmer with 1 dependent.
    Nalliah Navaratnam, an 18-year-old farmer with 11 dependents.
    Ponniah Thavarasa, a 23-year-old farmer with three dependents.
    S.Alagaiya Yogarasa, a 16-year-old washer-man with five dependents.
    S. Nadarasa, a 29-year-old farmer with one dependent.
    Sangarapillai Sabaratnam, a 35-year-old farmer with six dependents.
    Sangarapillai Shanmugasundaram, a 28-year-old farmer with one dependent.
    Shanmurasa Raveendran, a 19-year-old farmer with six dependents.
    Sinniah Rajendran, an 18-year-old farmer with ten dependents.
    Sithamparapillai Rasiah, a 35 year old farmer with two dependents.
    Suppiah Gengatharam, a 25-year-old farmer with three dependents.
    Thambiaiyah Kassipillai, , a 42-year-old farmer with eight dependents.
    Thambiaiyah Sivangnanam, a 20-year-old farmer with four dependents.
    Thambiaiyah Subramaniam, a 27-year-old farmer with three dependents.
    Thambiaiyah Velupillai, a 37-year-old farmer with seven dependents.
    Thamothari Sathasivam, a 45-year-old farmer with thirteen dependents.
    Veerakathy Thillainadarasa, a 29-year-old farmer with two dependents.
    Velupillai Chandran, a 22-year-old farmer with six dependents.
    Velupillai Sithamparapillai, a 36-year-old farmer with six dependents.

    The five men who are missing are: Thamothary Kanapathipillai - 52 years; Kandiah Ponnampalam - 45 years; Kandiah Kanagaiah - 55 years; Govinthar Kanapathipillai - 53 years (a snakebite doctor); Nagamany Sinnaiyar - 58 years. All are farmers.

    There was no stopping the violence. On December 18, eight policemen and a civilian driver died when their jeep hit a landmine in Batticaloa. The next day, two army officers and two soldiers died when two army trucks were blown up at Padaviya.

    "The same day [December 19, 1984], more than 1,000 young men were rounded up in Jaffna in a fresh crackdown. The government, alarmed at the sudden escalation in fighting, announced in Colombo its decision to put into use rockets, bombs and small-caliber artillery against Tamil guerrillas. The death toll in just one month, beginning the last week of November, was put at more than 400. By the end of 1984, Sri Lanka was waging a full-scale war against Tamil guerrillas, whose strength was estimated at several hundred and who enjoyed secure bases across Palk Strait. The militants also held the initiative, and military officials privately acknowledged." Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas by M R Naran Swamy, page 138 to 139.

    On December 14, 1984, the Sri Lankan President J R Jayewardene presented draft legislation for a five-tier administrative framework for the districts and provinces. Accordingly, Grammodhya Mandalayas, chosen from the voluntary societies in the villages, would be the basic administrative unit.

    Pradesheeya Sabhas - elected bodies; one for each 250 Assistant Government Agents divisions. District Councils - elected bodies; one for each 25 districts. Provincial Councils - the inter-district authority. Provisions were also made for District Ministers and Provincial Ministers.

    Council of States - this is on the national level for the creation of the second chamber.

    After presenting the draft legislation, the session of the All Party Conference (APC) was adjourned on December 21.

    Jayewardene defending his draft proposal, launching a campaign to gain support of his party members in parliament. He met his MPs in three batches. Meanwhile, Buddhist monks started a campaign against the proposals.

    Ven Madihe Pannaseeha Nayakka Thero convened a meeting at Naga Vihara, located in Sri Jayewardhenapura, Kotte and told Buddhist priests that the proposed arrangements posed a threat to the country, the Sinhala race and Buddhism. He appealed to the Buddhist priests to oppose the proposed provincial council system, and urged them to stage a satyagraha campaign.

    The TULF politburo met in Colombo and finally decided to give the proposal a chance. But, when the APC met on December 21, Jayewardene surprised the participants by inviting the delegates to send to him their views in writing. He also requested the Maha Sangha to examine the proposal very carefully. He further said that the government was ready to go before the people by way of a referendum or an election. He further expressed hope that his proposal would bring, peace, unity and stability in the country.

    Amirthalingham and TULF were unhappy, but when he wanted to make a statement at the APC he was not given the opportunity to do so. The TULF met that night and castigated Jayewardene. Based on the TULF resolve, Amirthalingham issued a two-page statement. In it, he pointed out that in his very first statement to the APC in January 1984 he had expressed very clearly that the TULF mandate at the 1977 parliamentary general elections was for a separate state for the Tamils.

    The party had agreed to accept the formation of an autonomous Tamil linguistic region comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces and had undertaken to recommend such alternative to the Tamil people, because it had accepted the good offices of India.

    In conclusion, Amirthalingham stated, "A careful study of the provisions of the draft bills placed before the conference will convince anyone that they fall far short of the regional autonomy indicated above. When we accepted the scheme of District Development Councils in 1980 it was clearly understood that it was not meant to be an alternative to our demand for a separate state."

    Immediately, Srimavo Bandaranaike issued a five-page statement. The SLFP party leader said, "The people of this country will be well advised to reject the draft legislation clearly and categorically."

    Cyril Mathew, the Minister of Industries and Scientific Research in J R Jayewardene's cabinet, released a letter addressed "Reverend Sirs, Honorable Ministers, Honorable Members of Parliament and Dear Friends," in which he said that he was "unable to advise anybody to agree to the proposed legislation". He appealed to the government to drop it entirely.

    Jayewardene then sacked Cyril Mathew from his cabinet, which was said to be a long overdue action. "Contentious issues relating to the Indian mediation effort and the eventual failure of the APC on the one hand, the worsening security situation in the Eastern province and an unauthorized effort to settling Sinhalese peasants on the right bank of the Mahaveli saw J R part company with two of his closest associates in political life, Cyril Mathew, a friend of many years and a long-standing political associate, as well as controversial Minister of Industries and Scientific Research and N G P Panditharatne, the chairman of the UNP, who also served as the administrative head of the Mahaveli Development Board. J R's decision to sack Mathew taken in the last week of December 1984 was the direct result of the latter's public criticism of J R's policies on the devolution. Mathew had prepared a memorandum setting out his views on these matters. If this had been restricted to members of his cabinet there was little J R could have done. When Mathew decided to distribute the document on a virtually island-wide basis, roneoed or Xeroxed, he breached one of the cardinal principles of cabinet government and J R had no alternative but to dismiss him from the cabinet." J R Jayewardene of Sri Lanka: A Political Biography Volume Two: From 1956 to His Retirement (1989) by K M de Silva and Howards Wriggins, page 600.

    Buddhist clergies in the meantime started to exert pressure. Jayewardene felt the overwhelming pressure and he was told that if he insisted on continuing with his proposals the Sinhala Buddhists would brand him a traitor.

    On December 26, 1984, the cabinet decided to discontinue with the All Party Conference. A communique to that effect was issued that evening: "Some of the proposals which represented the views of the majority of the delegations of the All Party Conference, were placed before the cabinet of ministers on Wednesday December 19, 1984 for discussions. They were discussed again on December 26. In the meantime, the Tamil United Liberation Front, which until December 21 was discussing the details of the system of government and decentralization of authority outlined in the proposals with the government delegation, had publicly proclaimed that no useful purpose could be served by discussing them further. The cabinet has therefore decided that no useful purpose could be achieved in discussing or arriving at a decision on these proposals. The cabinet requested His Excellency the President to continue his efforts to find political solution while taking all measures to eradicate terrorism."

    Thus ended an year-long exercise of a search for a peaceful resolution at the All Party Conference. In finding a solution to the ethnic problem the meeting dragged on until the very end of December 1984, without any definite outcome. The TULF was tired of the whole painful exercise. It was felt that the government was now bent on a military solution to the ethnic issue.

    On December 4, Sri Lankan army personnel shot and killed at least 90 Tamils unarmed civilians including, old men, women and children. They were all shot in cold blood by army personnel in reprisal for the killing of one of their colleagues in a landmine explosion on the same day.

    On December 13, Reverend George N Jeyarajasingham, a Methodist priest, his driver Abdul Cader Sulaiman, and a police constable named Jesuthasan Roche attached to the Murunkan police station, while traveling from Mannar to Murunkan were stopped by army personnel in civil. They subsequently shot and killed the three occupants of the car and it was reported that they burnt them with the vehicle.

    On January 2, 1985, the TULF secretary general A Amirthalingham sent Rajiv Gandhi a letter wishing him well again, "on behalf of the Tamils of Sri Lanka". Amirthalingham stated that "the problem of the 3 million Tamils in Sri Lanka has reached an impasse during the last two weeks, with President Jayewardene suddenly announcing the winding up of the All Party Conference and his cabinet deciding six days later to drop the proposals which he placed before the conference, and this decision brings to naught all the efforts of India for over one-and-a-half years".

    Amirthalingham concluded his letter, "The hope of a political settlement, which may bring the present state terrorism in the Tamil areas to an end, has receded completely. It was the offer of offers of offices of the late prime minister and her continued good concern in working out a final solution that ensured the security of the Tamil people from genocide and encouraged the negotiatory process. We are deeply thankful for the firm statement you were pleased to issue in December and the speeches you made indicating India's concern at the atrocities perpetrated against the Tamil in Sri Lanka. The present impasse calls for a new initiative by India whose good offices have been accepted by both the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil people. We have no help but India, and the helpless Tamils look up to you for their redemption from oppression and genocide."

    Amnesty International in its annual report released on 1985 recorded, "Amnesty International received many reports of torture and ill treatment of detainees in army custody or in police stations, the majority of whom had been arrested under the PTA. There were frequent reports of such detainees being beaten, in several instances with plastic pipes filled with sand. Released detainees stated that they had been beaten while hanging upside-down, had had needles inserted in various parts of the body and had been burned with cigarettes. One person reported witnessing soldiers shooting a fellow detainee through the hands; the victims subsequently died in army custody. Among the places where torture reportedly occurred were Elephant Pass Army Camp, Palaly Army Camp, Vavuniya Army Camp and Jaffna Fort. There was also allegation of torture by special interrogators at the newly established Boosa Army Camp in the south. Members of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and a number of JVP members or suspects were also allegedly beaten and ill-treated after the arrest.

    Mayan Vije, in his Militarization in Sri Lanka, published by the Tamil Information Center in London, clearly listed the tortured methods adopted by the Sri Lankan security forces.

    Beating, mainly on the buttocks, with plastic pipes filled with concrete.
    Hanging by the feet over a fire.
    Hanging by the feet over a fire with the head covered with a sack.
    Pushing pins down fingernails and toenails.
    Burning with lighted cigarettes all parts of the body, including the tongue.
    Slitting the skin and packing it with chilly powder.
    Slitting the skin and pouring in salt water.
    Thrusting a live python into the mouth.
    Forced to carry corpses.
    Inserting spikes into the body.
    Applying chilly powder to sensitive parts of the body.
    Beatings with gun butts, iron rods and batons.
    Hanging by the feet and beating.
    Deprived of food for many days and given salt water to drink.
    Deprived of food for many days and given rice mixed with small stones.
    After assaults causing injury, forced to lie on wet ground. Handcuffed throughout the night.
    Not allowing to sleep in the night.
    Kept nude for many days.
    Forced to kneel on hot sand for many hours.
    Forced to sleep in a room with corpses.
    Forced to lie on a hot tin sheets.
    Inserting needle-like wires into the urethra.
    Inserting iron rods covered with chilly paste into the rectum.
    Pulling out pubic hair with pliers.
    Forced to drink human blood.
    Forced to drink urine.
    Forced to drink toilet water.
    Pages 80 to 81.

    Annex 
    On February 24, 1983, Nadarajah Thangathurai, one of the first Tamil freedom fighters captured by the Sri Lanka government, was sentenced to life imprisonment. On March 1, 1983, he made a statement from the dock of the court which to this day remains one of the best testaments to Tamil sentiments in Sri Lanka. The full text of the statement reads:

    "We have already objected to a court in Sri Lanka subjecting us to an inquiry. Despite that objection a case has been fabricated against us, and the trial has gone on for nearly four months.

    "Our senior counsel, Nadesan Satyendra, has exposed the somersaults of the Sri Lanka police witnesses both by his cross-examination and by his concluding submissions. He has also exposed the various acts of torture to which we were subjected at the hands of the Sri Lankan authorities. Our respected senior counsel has said that he bows his head in humility in front of us who have been willing to give our lives for the liberation of our people. May I only say that his dedication and sustained effort and the many faceted legal skills that he has employed from the day that he took on the responsibility for this case to this very day is a duty that he has nobly discharged for the Tamil people and is in no way less than what we have done.

    "His skill can be seen in every aspect of this case. His two-day address on the question of the admissibility of the statements made in custody served to further the cause of truth and will find a place of honor in the history of our struggle. It is my deepest wish that such legal expertise and noble dedication will not be confined simply to a court of law, or to the cause of a particular people but will shine on behalf all oppressed peoples in the world in the years to come.

    "When the British government entrusted the fate of the Tamils to a group of Sinhala politicians, the Tamil people did not clamor for freedom for themselves. They did not suspect that they would in course of time be made second-class citizens of this country. But some Tamil leaders did perceptively ask for bigger representation for the Tamils in the legislature. This was justified by later events when the plantation Tamils were deprived of their franchise. What the next 25 years saw was not only the erosion of Tamil rights but also the erosion of the Tamil homeland. For 25 years, the Tamil leaders expressed their protest in parliament and outside, adopting the principles of ahimsa andsatyagraha. But what happened?

    "In 1956 the Tamil leaders sat down to a peaceful protest on Galle Face Green. Sinhala thugs were unleashed on them. Later, in 1961, when the Tamil leaders and the Tamil people sat in peaceful satyagraha in front of the Jaffna Kachcheri, the Sri Lankan army did not fail to react with inhumane violence.

    "In which chapter of your long history of democracy are you going to incorporate these events? Not one, not two, but there have been a continuing series of thuggery and violence inflicted on the Tamil people over a period of 25 years. How many chapters will you need to record this 25-year villainy? How many Tamils have been robbed of both their lives and their material wealth? There have been Tamil women whose chastity has been offended in the very presence of their family members.

    "Tamil cultural wealth preserved for generations has been put to flames. What a mockery to think that these could be compensated by a few lakhs of rupees! Have all these acts of hurt and humiliation made the Tamil people lose their determination? Have they gone back on their ideals? These acts of hurt and humiliation have only strengthened their resolve. We have never missed an opportunity to make the Sri Lanka government conscious of our mind. Twice in two elections the Tamil people have recently re-stated their aspirations.

    "Is it not ridiculous for a government that promotes race hatred and race killings to look at us and call us 'terrorists'? While on the one hand celebrations were going on to mark '50 years of Parliamentary democracy', [in 1981] Tamil members of the same parliament were subject to midnight arrest and the house of one member of parliament was set on fire. These are not acts that you can do in a civilized world and then hold your head high. You talk of terrorism and robbery. Has this country seen anything to compare with the state terrorism and the race hate carried out with state weaponry? We have even heard of influential Sri Lanka government politicians terrorizing people with revolvers!

    "Allegations are made that we are asking for separation, that we are trying to divide the country. When were we undivided after all? Our traditional land captured by the European invaders has never been restored to us. We have not even mortgaged our land at any time to anyone in the name of one country. Our land has changed hands off and on under various regimes, and that is what has happened. We have yet to reach a stage when we can have our land for ourselves.

    "What we ask for is not division but freedom. Why we ask this is not because of narrow [minded] thinking. What we hope to achieve is not only the emancipation of the Tamil people but the greater good of the Sinhalese people themselves. Why? Because, thereafter, the so-called Tamil problem will cease to be a livelihood for opportunist Sinhalese politicians. That will provide a chance for the Sinhalese people to free themselves from the political, social and economic shackles that bind them today and realize where their true slavery lies.

    "There is no testament in the world that declares that a people who fight to recover their own rights or work for their self-determination are guilty of sedition or terrorism. Had you endorsed our basic human rights at the very beginning this situation would not have arisen. You had not only not recognized our rights but for the purpose of clinging on to political seats of power you had been injecting into the poor innocent Sinhalese people hate and venom over the past 35 years. That not all the Sinhala people have fallen victims to your racist poison has been proved by the fact that many of them during the time of race riots, have time and again rescued Tamils from armed thugs and complete extermination. It has been customary for every opposition party in Sri Lanka that wants to come to power to obstruct any settlement of the Tamil question and rouse the Sinhala people for that purpose.

    "As against that, for a ruling party to permit racist violence as it has done during the past six years is more reprehensible. If the relationship between the Tamil people and the Sri Lanka government has reached the present deplorable state, that responsibility lies squarely with the present dispensation.

    "For the past quarter century, the ruling governments have like parrots kept on repeating the same threadbare statements 'we will solve the Tamil question'. Whether we accept your solutions or not, what honest attempts have been made to solve the problems of the Tamils? While holding out the bogus promise of solving the problems of the Tamil people, you have spent all your time in trying to blunt Tamil resistance. What have the Tamil people asked you? Not economic benefits, not employment opportunities. That no such benefits could come from you is a fact well known to them.

    "Even if you do come forward to grant these benefits, what guarantee can you give the Tamils that they could live with self-respect in this island in the future? What ever you give them without securing that self-respect will be alien to them. In this island there are sanctuaries for even wild animals, but up to now there is no sanctuary in any part of this island where Tamils can live without fear. This is not something we can expect from you in the future either.

    "The Deputy Solicitor General in the course of his cross-examination turned to Mr Yogachandran and asked him: 'Do you intend to use this court of law as a platform?' Of what use are platforms to us? We did not ask anybody to provide us platforms. It was you who brought us to this court and heaped accusations on us. When you not only throw lies at us but also try to make out that we are liars, we simply came out with the truth.

    "Truth does not require platforms. It has its own glory. No power on earth can suppress it forever.

    "We are not lovers of violence nor victims of mental disorders. We are honest fighters belonging to an organization that is struggling to liberate a people.

    "To those noble souls who keep on prating 'terrorism, terrorism' we have something to say. Did you not get frightened of terrorism when hundreds of Tamils were massacred in cold blood, when racist hate spread like fire in this country of yours? Did terrorism mean nothing to you when Tamil women were raped? When cultural treasures were set on fire? When hundreds and hundreds of Tamil homes were looted? Why in 1977 alone 400 Tamils lost their lives reddening the sky above with their splattered blood - did you not see any terrorism then? Did your thoughts and feelings become deadened when it concerned Tamil lives and Tamil property or are your minds unable to conceive the very idea of Tamil suffering?

    "There is nothing that prevents two neighboring nations living in cooperation. You must not run away with the thought that our sole objective is to establish Tamil Eelam. Tamil Eelam certainly remains an objective because we have learnt through bitter experience over the past several years that it is only by establishing a state of Tamil Eelam can Tamils live with self-respect.

    "But our vision is broader than that. Our vision is global. Wherever there is oppression, wherever there is violation of human dignity, whether in Africa or in Latin America, we are prepared to link hands with the oppressed and the underdog. When our vision is so global how can it fail to take into account the future good of the Sinhala people?

    "May I mention this? We will not stop at raising our voices on behalf of those people. There is nothing that prevents two neighboring nations living in cooperation. Even nations with differing policies get together for common economic good and for the purpose of common security. Does that mean that those nations give up their distinctive characteristics or sovereignty?

    "We have to safeguard the collective good of this island. If at any time in the future a common organization has to emerge which could withstand the political and economic onslaught made against Third world countries, particularly in the areas surrounding the Indian subcontinent, you can be sure that Tamil Eelam will rise to lend its might in all cooperative endeavors that will raise the quality of life of the people of this part of the world.

    "I want to ask this question from my Sinhala friends. Do you accept as correct and justified the various acts of oppression that the Tamil people have suffered until now not only in our land but in various parts of your land as a result of various acts of thuggery and terrorism? Do you also consider wrong our attempt to free ourselves from the inhumane oppression of your government?

    "Or do you consider that this present eyewash in the form of a trial conducted under special laws an act of fairness to a people like us who are fighting for a noble ideal, the ideal of human freedom? Or does it mean that you do not care what happens because the victims are Tamils? If that is so, our sympathies are with you.

    "Believe me our freedom is an assured fact and will come. Once that happens your law books and terrorist laws cannot touch us. Thereafter you will be the sole 'beneficiaries' of the very laws that oppress us now.

    "Will you urge your government to stop the injustice against us and acknowledge our sovereignty?

    "Will you as a first step toward this and toward the eradication of terrorism, urge your government to recall the Sri Lanka police force and the armed forces - wholesale merchants of terrorism -from our soil?

    "I leave it to you to decide whether you will show the world how committed you are to justice. Though belonging to a different nation, as fellow humans living in the same island we have participated in the inquiry hoping for your understanding. Today we have made our position quite clear. If the understanding that flows from this prompts you in the future to raise your voice on our behalf, our hearts will be filled with satisfaction.

    "I wish to tell you sincerely here and now that even if this understanding does not become a reality, we will throw the full weight of our support behind you, when you rise up in the future to free yourselves and shatter the social and economic fetters that shackle you now.

    "Through this case we have made our real position known to the world and in particular to the peoples of this island. This is the joyous feeling that is uppermost in our minds ... Even a hundred fabricated cases against us and all the slanders heaped on us will not bother us. It is we who will win through this kind action of yours - the consequences of the verdict of this court will not touch us, content as we are that we have done our duty.

    "We will not flinch from embracing death or spending the rest of our lives in jail, content as we are that we have done our duty. All these are merely commonplace incidents in the history of a nation's struggle for freedom. We were fully conscious of what we were doing. Hence there is no question of disappointment.

    "We are firm believers in the saying that what one sows one reaps. That is why our minds are calm. The seeds we sowed were not seeds of poison, our arrowheads were not dipped in venom. But my fervent prayer is that innocent Sinhala people should not have to reap what power-hungry Sinhala politicians have sown. These tribulations are a boon bestowed by God to purify us.

    "The final victory is ours. Long Live Tamil Eelam!"
    Courtesy: sangam.org

    NEXT: Chapter 32: Limbo between war and peace 
  • Thursday, May 30, 2013

    SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY Chapter 30: Whirlpool of violence

    SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY
    Chapter 30: Whirlpool of violence 

    By K T Rajasingham

    The July 1983 holocaust opened the floodgates for Tamil youths looking to join various Tamil militant organizations. Until 1983, the Tamil militants had not received any proper training. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) managed to have a couple of training centers in the jungles of the Northern province. But these training centers provided very rudimentary training, such as rifle shooting, instruction about the use of revolvers and shot guns, and the manufacture and handling of explosives. Basic training in the crudest forms were offered to the Tamil youths. However, the enthusiasm shown by the leaders of the militant organizations to train the Tamil youths, as well as by the Tamil youths to be trained by a few retired policemen and army personnel, were something appreciable.

    The Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) was initially organized by Thangathurai and Kuttimani, and both were from Valvetiturai. After their arrest on April 3, 1981, at Manalkadu, located in the East Point Pedro, Sri Sabaratnam, alias "Tall" Sri and Rasupillai, took over the leadership of the organization. TELO established close relationships with Indira Gandhi's administration and was the first group to be approached by Indian intelligence agencies for military training.

    After the death of Thangathurai and Kuttimany, TELO set up camps in Nelliady, Kattaikadu, Jaffna, in the Northern province and in Trincomalee, as well as in Batticaloa.

    After the Pondy Bazaar shootout incident on May 19, 1982, the LTTE was split into two organizations. Despite the split, and despite losing its two best fighters, Seelan and Sellakili, the LTTE was the best organized and disciplined militant group, from the very early days of the inception of Tamil militancy.

    Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) was founded on January 3, 1975, at Wandsworth, London, in the residence of Eliyathamby Ratnasabapathy, or Ratna in short. EROS had earlier planned to send 50 people to Lebanon to be trained by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. EROS was led by a unified command of three persons: Ratnasabapathy, Shankar Rajee and Velupillai Balakumar.

    It was said that the ambassador of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to London was known to Ratna very well and EROS arranged to send its members for training through this ambassador. In the first batch, only three members, Shankar, Arular and Kanex, went for training to Beirut in March 1976. It was a very rigorous six-month training period and Arular left for Sri Lanka after three months, while Shankar and Kanex completed the training.

    "The PLO was then locked in a bloody civil war in Lebanon, which it controlled like a state within a state. It did not seem to matter to the PLO that the government of Srimavo Bandaranaike was favorably inclined toward it, and that the Tamils were at war with that government. Abu Jihad, Arafat's military right-hand man, explained to a group of Sri Lankans at a Lebanese training camp that the PLO thought 'creating bubbles of anti-imperialism everywhere or wherever possible would indirectly help their [Palestinians'] own struggle'. When Bandaranaike realized what was happening, she wrote to Arafat explaining the Tamil issue and trying to dissuade the latter from helping the Tamil ultras. But the PLO simply ignored her letter." Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas by M R Narayan Swamy, page 98.

    According to Narayan Swamy, one of the earliest trainees, Shankar, said that Abu Jihad showed him the prime minister's letter. This was a serious diplomatic lapse in Abu Jihad showing a letter of that nature written to Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO.

    When this writer had the opportunity to meet with his PLO contacts in Tunis, Tunisia, (Rami Quadami, the officer in charge of the Economic Affairs of PLO and a son of Farouk Quadomi, the PLO's equivalent of the Foreign Affairs Minister), Rami said that the al-Fattah section of the PLO never ever gave any military training to any Tamils from Sri Lanka. It must have been George Habash's Popular Front for the Palestinians (PFLP), or any other Palestinian organization, but not the al-Fattah section, belonging to Yasser Arafat. He also said that Chairman Yasser Arafat and Srimavo Bandaranaike had a good rapport and both showed deep mutual respect and regard for each other.

    In 1976, EROS converted the Kannati farm in Vavuniya into a militant training camp. Later, EROS and the LTTE reached an agreement and the LTTE also used this farm for their early military training. It is reported that Prabakaran and Uma Maheswaran had their early training here on this farm.

    The Eelam People Revolutionary Left Front (EPRLF) was the breakaway group of EROS and was inaugurated at Kumbakonam, Tamil Nadu, in October 1981.The founding president of EPRLF was Gunasekaran, while the secretary general was Pathmanabah, alias Ranjan or Nabah, and the commander-in-chief was Douglas Devananda.

    The EPRLF subsequently established contacts with George Habas's PFLP. They gave military training to the members of EPRLF, as well as to those of the People Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). George Habash was emphatic that the Tamils should have the best of ties with New Delhi and was cautious in his opinion about what the Indian government would think about the Tamil-Palestinian connection.

    PLOTE was formed in 1983. Former chairman of the LTTE, Kathirkamar Uma Maheswaran, alias Muhundan, was the founder and the general secretary of the organization. PLOTE in the beginning had a 24-member central committee. The political wing was headed by Political Secretary Ramalingham Vasudeva, alias Ramu, and the military wing was led by military secretary Somasunderam Sotheeswaran, alias Kannan.

    Other than the above five main militant organizations, there were many more small groups, such as: the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA); the Tamil Eelam Liberation Extremists (TELE); the Tamil Eelam Revolutionary Organization (TERO); the Tamil Eelam Revolutionary People's Liberation Army (TERPLA); the Red Front Tamil Eelamists (RFTE); the Tamil Eelam Liberation Guerrillas (TELG); the National Liberation Front of Tamil Eelam (NLFTE); the Ilankai Freedom Tamil Army (IFTA); the Tamil Eelam Defense Front (TEDF); the Tamil Eelam National Army (TENA); the Tamil People's Security Organization (TPSO); the Tamil People's Security Front (TPSF); the Tamil Eelam Commando (TEC); the Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF); the Tamil Eelam Eagles Front (TEEF); the Revolutionary Warriors (RW); the Guerrilla Army of Tamil Eelam (GATE); the Red Crescent Guerrillas (RCG); the Eagle Movement (EM); the Socialist Revolutionary Social Liberation (SRSL); the Tamil Eelam Blood Movement (TEBM); the Tamil People Communal Unit (TPCU); the Eelam Liberation Tigers (ELT); the Eelam Liberation Defense Front (ELDF); the Revolutionary Eelam Liberation Organization (RELO); the Tamil Eelam Security Service (TESS); the People's Liberation Party (PLP); the Tamil People Democratic Front (TPDF); the Tamil Eelam Liberation Cobras (TELC); the Three Stars (TS); and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF).

    After the 1983 riots, Indian intelligence organization, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), began to reach out to various Tamil militant groups. They contacted them to ascertain their willingness to participate in military training to be provided by India. Initially, RAW operatives selected TELO for training, because it was not committed to any political philosophy. It was willing to do anything India wanted them to do. The Indian government had its own reasons for coming forward to train the Tamil militants. Though India was never serious about Eelam, it came forward to train the Tamil youths to possibly teach a lesson to the Sri Lankan government.

    Training began in September 1983, at Dehra Dun, in the hills of Uttar Predesh, with the first batch of 350 TELO cadres. Hundreds of Tamil boys crossed the Palk straits, the narrow sea strip, to India by boats and from Madras they went by train to New Delhi and later by trucks and buses to Dehra Dun to learn the art of military science from the Indian military trainers.

    Meanwhile, while making intense arrangements to train the Tamil youths from various militant organizations, India maintained an innocent facade and strongly denied that it was providing any training to the Tamil youths. At a public meeting in Bombay, on September 15, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said, "We have never interfered with the internal developments of any country in the past and we will not do so now."

    RAW arranged to take groups of youths from EROS, EPRLF, and PLOTE separately, and took them to Uttar Pradesh and trained them at different locations around Dehra Dun, near the Delhi airport and at Ramakrishnapuram, in the heart of New Delhi itself. Initially, training was given to 200 cadres from EROS, 100 from EPRLF, and 70 from PLOTE.

    In the meantime, the LTTE cadres were not provided with training by RAW. It was Anton Balasingham, with the help of D I G Alexander, who met with RAW officials and convinced them about the LTTE. He brought to the notice of RAW officials that, unlike other organizations, the LTTE was already engaged in armed struggle and therefore should also have a military training program.

    Earlier, there were many versions of how arrangements were made for RAW to give military training to the cadres of the LTTE. But in her book, Will to Freedom, Adele Balasingham gives below the authoritative version:

    "Once Delhi agreed to provide military training to the LTTE, it was necessary for Mr Pirabakaran to return to India to practically implement the program. Pirabakaran was maintaining a training camp in Vanni at that time. Bala sent a message informing him of RAW's willingness to offer military training to LTTE cadres and requesting him to come to India. Pirabakaran dispatched two of his lieutenants, Raghu and Mahathaya, to meet Bala in Chennai and to find out details about India's offer. Mahathaya and Raghu met Bala and myself in a hostel in Madurai. Bala explained to them in detail about the Indian training program. Yet they were opposed to Pirabakaran returning to India, where he was wanted at that time.

    "They were highly skeptical and considered the offer of training as a ruse to lure him back to India for his arrest. Bala wrote to Pirabakaran reassuring him that, in the political climate of the day, he couldn't imagine a scenario, where the LTTE leader would be taken into custody. Raghu and Mahathaya returned to Jaffna carrying the correspondence with them. Mr Pirabakaran trusted Bala's judgment and preparations were made to spirit him back to India to contact with RAW. All this, of course were supposed to be top secret and much cloak and dagger activity went on. After Mr Pirabakaran's arrival in India, a meeting with top RAW officials was set up in Pondicherry, the Tamil Nadu's neighboring state. So in the middle of the night, Bala, myself and a couple of bodyguards piled into a car and drove the long distance to Pondicherry for the secret meeting with the LTTE leaders and the big guns in the RAW. At a specified time, the crucial meeting took place between Mr Pirabakaran, Bala, and RAW officials. Bala's and Thamby's [Prabakaran] smiling faces on their return to our rooms indicated that the meeting was a success. The LTTE was poised to embark on the Indian military training program." - pages 73-74

    It was further reported that Prabakaran was angry over the training facilities promised to groups like TELO. He was also upset that RAW was activating dormant Tamil militant groups. When RAW officials met Prabakaran at the secret meeting place at Pondicherry, with the view to appease him, they brought along a gift for Prabakaran, a 7.62 mm German Lugar pistol.

    Military training was given in the use of automatic and semi-automatic weapons, self-loading rifles, 84mm rocket launchers, heavy weapons, and in laying mines, map readings, guerrilla warfare, mountaineering, demolitions, and anti-tank warfare. Each training program lasted three to four months and rarely up to six months. Training was also given separately to officers and soldiers. Select members were given special training in diving and under-sea sabotage. A limited number of Tamils were hand-picked for intelligence gatherings.

    After the training, RAW arranged arms deliveries to various groups, since it was the early part of 1984 and India continued to deny as strongly as possible that it was involved in any training and arming of the Tamil militants in India, or in any form of cross-border terrorism.

    In 1983, the Tamil militant groups began to open up offices in Tamil Nadu, India, mainly in Chennai and Madurai. Tamil militant camps cropped up in Madras, Chengalpattu, Tiruchi, Pudukottai, South Arcot, Salem, Thanjavur, Ramanathapuram, Madurai, and Coimbatore. The Indian government kept the secret of the training program of the Tamil militant cadres so well, that even A Amirthalingham, the leader of TULF, was not informed of the training. Incidentally, he came to know only in April 1984.

    Earlier in 1968, with the view to assist India in the projection of its power, Indira Gandhi had established India's first foreign intelligence agency, RAW, which was supposed to be the equivalent of America's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This agency came directly under the control and supervision of the prime minister. This new intelligence agency played a leading and active role in covert activities in East Pakistan, which subsequently led to the formation of Bangladesh.

    When Indira Gandhi was defeated in the 1977 parliamentary elections, RAW also became controversial and Moraji Desai, the new prime minister, downgraded it. Once Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980, the agency and its activities began to flourish again.

    During the 1983 riots, it was brought to the notice of India that the Sri Lankan government was seeking military assistance from some foreign countries. This was one unique factor that made India react to the affairs of Sri Lanka. According to the "Indira Doctrine":

    1. India has no intention of intervening in the internal conflicts of a South Asian country and it strongly opposes intervention by any other.

    2. India will not tolerate external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country, if that intervention has any implicit or explicit anti-Indian implication. No South Asian government must therefore ask for military assistance with an anti-Indian bias from any country.

    3. If a South Asian country genuinely needs external help to deal with a serious internal conflict situation, or with an intolerable threat to a government legitimately established, it should ask help from a number of neighboring countries including India. The exclusion of India from such a contingency will be considered to be an anti-Indian move on the part of the government concerned.

    Though these were not declared or proclaimed doctrines of Indira Gandhi, they were considered India's naturally adopted foreign policy toward neighboring countries in South Asia. This was a message to the countries in the region, as well as outside of the region, that India's interests should be reciprocated and respected.

    Meanwhile, on September 27, 1983, a group of Tamil militants raided the Batticalao security prison, overwhelmed the guards and tied them up. It was a bloodless, great jail break in the history of Sri Lanka and everyone was thrilled and excited as the events unfolded.

    It later became known that the jail break was masterminded by PLOTE and assisted by Thambapillai Maheswaran, better known as "Panagoda" Maheswaran and David, both of whom were too prisoners. David arranged the map depicting the layout of the prison, which was smuggled out to those involved in the break-out. They grabbed two jail guards, Anton and Gnapiragasam, when they came out with tea for the prisoners at 7:45 pm. They locked up the eight guards and the jailor, opened the prison gates, and told all the prisoners to run away.

    More than 200 prisoners, including 41 Tamil militants who survived the twin Welikade massacre of July 25 and 27 and who were transferred from Welikade to Batticaloa on July 27, escaped from the prison. In the great prison escape, many Sinhalese prisoners - most of them hardcore criminals - also escaped.

    Outside the prison, people waited with vehicles to whisk away the militant escapees to freedom. Among the escapees were Dr S A David, secretary of the Gandhiyam Movement, Rev B Jeyakularajah, Jeytilakarajah, Tampapillai Maheswaran, Rev Sinnarasa, M Nithyanandan, Vamadeva, and Varatharajap Perumal. But, Father Singarayar declined to join them. His argument was that he would be presumed guilty if he escaped. Similarly, a gravely-ill Kovai Mahesan chose to stay behind along with Dr S A Tharmalingham, and eventually all three were freed and taken to Jaffna in early November 1983.

    When the police arrived to the prison, they found it virtually empty, except for those who refused to move out of the prison on principle. Sri Lankan security forces launched a massive manhunt operation to trace the fugitives, who eventually made it to India.

    In the confusion during the Batticaloa jail break, Nirmala Nithyaandan was inadvertently left behind in her cell. Nine months later, the LTTE succeeded in gaining access to her cell and getting her out of prison. Though the security forces immediately launched an intense sea and air search, Nirmala Nithyanandan managed to reach Chennai safely after spending two torturous years in custody.

    About Nirmala Nithyananthan, Adele Balasingham in her The Will to Freedom, writes as follows:

    "Nirmala Nithyananthan was projected as a literary figure and feminist, illegally imprisoned for her political views and violation of her human rights and in danger of being subjected to inhumane treatment. An international campaign for her freedom was launched. Nirmala's continued imprisonment was a source of grave concern, particularly during the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 when Sinhala inmates and prison guards massacred Tamil political prisoners. Housed in the women's wing of the prison, she was lucky to escape the torment of the women prisoners and was eventually transferred to Batticaloa jail, along with the surviving Tamil detainees. The LTTE cadres in Batticaloa district planned a raid to free the remaining Tamil political prisoners. When I heard that she had been freed from the Batticaloa prison in the middle of 1984, by one of our cadre during a daring escape operation, I was thrilled and her boldness added to my respect for her. I received the news from Mr Pirabakaran that she would be coming to Chennai to work with the organization, with great expectancy. I looked forward to work with an English-speaking colleague with whom I could discuss many issues.

    "Mr Pirabakaran was less than enthusiastic about the prospect of Nirmala joining the LTTE and a contradiction in feminist perception was clearly evident. For him, Nirmala's conception and projection of women liberation did not tally with his view or vision of Tamil women's liberation. In Mr Pirabakaran's ideological perspective, Nirmala's idea of a women's liberation represented more stereotyped conception of Western women's liberation than an emancipation which the masses of Tamil women could identify with and embrace as their own. Delegating the task of building the women's wing of the LTTE to Nirmala was not in Mr Pirabakaran's scheme of things. Mr Pirabakaran proved to be correct in his view of Nirmala as unsuitable for any role in the women's wing. Not only he, but also the girls who were with us, had difficulty in relating to and comprehending Nirmala's 'radicalism'. She was worlds apart from the village girls who had come to join the struggle and fight for their homeland and had no real idea of women's liberation, nor necessarily aspired for it. Indeed, Mr Pirabakaran was far more effective in tapping into the sentiments and thinking of the young Tamil women and winning their support and he persisted with his commitment to building a women's section and has subsequently assumed the role of leader and mentor of the wing. Not even Nirmal's gallant history or opposition to the state forces could dislodge alienation or inspire any confidence in women's emancipation. Nirmala revealed herself as a vehement critic of the organization but was totally incapable of offering any realistic, viable alternative which would mobilize the people to confront the mounting scale of oppression they were being subjected to. The young women's dislike of Nirmala, and many other issues that became controversial, ultimately resulted in her divorce from the organization. But while Nirmala's relationship with the LTTE was essentially underproductive, the role played by her husband Mr Nithyanandan [affectionately called Nithy] was creative and productive. As the editor of the organization's official newspaper "Viduthalai Puligal" [Liberation Tigers] he wrote several articles representing the LTTE's position and introducing other national liberation struggles to our cadres and readers. While the paper has survived since 1984 as the official organ of the LTTE, Mr Nithyanandan has not. He departed from the organization along with his wife at the end of 1984." - Pages 86-87

    Meanwhile, the government passed the seventh amendment to the Constitution on September 23, 1983, to create a new administrative district for Kilinochchi and thereby increase the number of administrative districts to 25. Ranatunge Premadasa, speaking on the amendment to the Constitution, said that the government had not chosen to create a new district to please the TULF or anybody else. The creation of the new districts in Mullaithievu, Gampaha, and Kilinochchi were all in the Moragoda Commissionis recommendation. The second reading of the Bill to amend the Constitution was passed with 119 voting in favor and none against.

    It must be remembered that, since the TULF refused to take oath under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, they did not attend the parliament sessions. Meanwhile, a majority of the members of parliament, including M Sivasithamparam, the president, and A Amirthalingham, the secretary general of the TULF, sought refuge in India. Subsequently, October 20, 1983, was the last day of the three-month period for the TULF to take an oath under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, but they failed to do so. As a result, their seats in parliament became vacant and they lost their membership and representation in the National State Assembly of Sri Lanka.

    On November 3, 1983, Anura Bandaranaike, the first-time SLFP member of parliament, became the leader of the opposition. Anura Priadarshi Solomon Dias Bandaranaike, born on February 15, 1949, was the youngest of the three children of the late S W R D and Srimavo Bandaranaike. His father was prime minister from 1956-59 and his mother from 1960-65 and again from 1970-77. His higher education years were spent at the University of London from 1970-73. He was elected in the July 1977 general election, as the second member of parliament from the three-member Nuwera-Eliya constituency.

    Since the TULF's elected representatives voluntarily vacated their parliamentary membership, there was no one left to represent the Tamils of the North and Eastern provinces in parliament. As a substitute to the representation of the members of parliament, the people in big towns or in each electorates formed themselves into "citizen committees". The members of these citizen committees were mainly people of standing in their respective areas and were independent of the militant groups. They filled the gap left behind by the self-exiled TULF members of parliament in representing the people of the area.

    This writer was also the secretary to the citizen committee at Chunnakam, while T Manickavasakar, the retired director of education in the Northern province, was the president. Citizen committees mainly represented the people by making representations to the army, as well as to the government, to find redress for innocent citizens affected by army atrocities and police excesses. These committees also visited youths who were detained either in the police stations or in the army camps and such regular visits served as deterrents against torture by the security forces, at least to some extent. Additionally, these citizen committees began to be considered the watchdog organizations for the rights of the people in the area.

    The citizen committees began to earn considerable credibility in the eyes of the government, people of the area in general, and in the foreign institutions that encouraged humanitarian activities. They also began to concentrate on resettling the displaced persons within their areas and also took an active interest on the welfare of refugees who fled Sri Lanka. But gradually, these committees began to earn the wrath of the Tamil militants and the militants began to relegate them to less active roles.

    Earlier, Indira Gandhi, following the ethnic violence of July 1983, responded to the Sri Lankan government's request by sending the ship "Bharat Seema" to transport Tamils affected by the indiscriminate violence inflicted on them to the north and east regions of India. After the completion of the mission, when the "Bharat Seema" left on August 30, 1983 to Tuticorin, it took nearly 340 Tamil refugees to India.

    After the arrival of the first batch of refugees, there was a constant flow of Tamil refugees to India. The refugees mainly flowed into India through the regular ferry service that was plying between Rameswaram in India and Talaimannar, in northern Sri Lanka three times a week. This flow of refugees, according to available records, started on August 1983 and continued until the ferry service was temporarily closed for the monsoon season in October 1983, but it again started on January 1984 and continued to operate until the last week of October 1984. Those who crossed over to India by the ferry had passports, as well as entry visas, issued by the Indian High Commission in Colombo and were in compliance with all normal entry procedures.

    The Shipping Corporation of India then expressed its inability to run the ferry service between Rameswaram and Talaimannar, as the Sri Lankan government had declared the coastline between Mannar and Mullaithievu a surveillance zone and demarcated the five-mile stretch of land between these two places as a "no man's land". Subsequently, the Indian Shipping Corporation consigned the "TSS Ramanujam", the ferry that plied between Talaimannar and Rameswaram, to the scrap-yard, bringing a permanent end to the ferry service.

    No official reason was given for the abrupt shutting down of the ferry service by India, but it was reported that the Sri Lankan government was proceeding with plans for repatriating 84,000 Tamils. They were granted Indian citizenship and opted to leave for India under the provisions of the Srima-Sashtri Agreement and the subsequent legislation that came into force. But India showed reluctance in accepting these people until arrangements were made for the return of nearly 125,000 refugees who were already in India by that time.

    Once the normal ferry services were stopped, refugees began to cross the choppy sea by country craft. Up to the end of March 1985, nearly 500 boats called at the port of Rameswaram and in the beginning, boats bringing the refugees were detained by the port authorities. They were subsequently released in order to carry out their humanitarian services.

    The presence of a large number of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India resulted in the Sri Lankan government receiving adverse comments and opinions in several international forums. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government began to adopt measures to discourage Tamils from fleeing to India. The Sri Lankan Navy began to intercept boat people crossing to India on the high seas. They arrested fleeing refugees, and also shot and killed refugees while on the sea. On March 3, 1985, nearly 13 Sri Lankan refugees were shot and killed on the high seas by the Sri Lankan Navy. On that same day, 140 were arrested and another 247 prevented from leaving the island.

    Furthermore, the fishermen in the island of Rameswaram have been forced to suspend their fishing operations in the face of repeated mid-sea attacks by the Sri Lankan Navy. From December 10, 1984, to July 1986, it was estimated that nearly 20 Indian fishermen were shot and killed by the Sri Lankan Navy. Thus, the Sri Lankan government brought the war against the Tamils to the shores of India.

    The Sri Lankan government did not agree with the announcement of figures estimating that 125,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees were already in India. "It was estimated that some 35,000 Tamil refugees crossed to Tamil Nadu in the immediate aftermath of the riots. Their numbers increased, in time, to double this amount at least. The Indian government claimed that there were 125,000 refugees from Sri Lanka by the early part of 1984. J R and his advisers believed that these numbers had been exaggerated by the Indian officials for their own political ends. For the advocates of military intervention, the refugee problem was yet another parallel to the situation in East Pakistan, which had paved the way for Indian intervention and resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, although the two situations were quite substantially different." J R Jayewardene of Sri Lanka: A Political Biography - Volume Two: From 1956 to His Retirement (1989) by K M de Silva and Howard Wriggins, page 570.

    When G Parthasarathy visited Colombo on August 15, 1983, he called on S Thondaman at his ministry and discussed issues relating to the ethnic crisis in the country. After their discussion, Parthasrathy invited Thondaman to visit New Delhi. Accordingly, Thondaman went to India, met Indira Gandhi, and Narasimha Rao, the Minister of External Affairs. In Tamil Nadu, he met M G Ramachandran, the Chief Minister, and M Karunanithi, the leader of the D M K.

    Thondaman also met the TULF leaders Amirthalingham, Sivasithamparam, and Sampanthan and had a series of discussions with them. Amirthalingham requested Thondaman to look after the interest of the Tamils in parliament. He also met Uma Maheswaran, the militant leader of the PLOTE, which created a controversy back home.

    After a 10-day sojourn in India, Thondaman returned to Colombo on October 22 and met J R Jayewardene, the Sri Lankan president, the next day and briefed him about his Indian visit. That evening, he held a press conference and told the press, "The people of Tamil Nadu feel intensely about the Tamil problem. The feeling in India is that the successive Sri Lankan governments that came to power after independence have been intent on oppressing the Tamils and destroying them. Now the issue of the Tamils is not alone the concern of the Tamils and India, but the concern of the international community."

    In answer to a question, he said, "The people of Tamil Nadu say that the Sri Lankan government closed its eyes when violence was being unleashed against the Tamils by a section of the Sinhalese communal forces." He said that people told him, "Sri Lankan Sinhalese observe sill [chanting] in the night and kill in the next morning." In fact, the riots erupted on the day following the holy Poya day. He also said that he had now become the sole representative of the Tamils.

    He said that his meeting with Uma Maheswaran was a successful one and that the militant leader had agreed to accept an alternative to Eelam. But many Sinhalese politicos were not satisfied with the meeting Thondaman had with Uma Maheswaran. On November 11, the Gampaha member of parliament S D Bandaranike raised this matter in parliament at the adjournment time. Quoting a statement made by Thondaman in India earlier, and he charged that the Tamil minister's characterization was a one-sided picture of the ethnic problem.

    "In reply, Thondaman said he had thought S D Bandranaike was a friend of the Tamils. When the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact was negotiated, the UNP leader Jayewardene led a protest march to Kandy, and it was S D Bandaranaike who stopped it and was acclaimed a Sinhalese hero. He stopped the march by using thuggery - and thus became the father of the doctrine of thuggery, violence and stone-throwing. The doctrine had now been developed and perfected in Sri Lanka, he said.

    "SLFP MP Lakshman Jayakody and S D Bandaranaike wanted to know who had perfected the doctrine of thuggery?

    "Jayakody: "He must say who these people are. It can even mean us. The SLFP had nothing to do with the violence.

    "S D Bandaranaike: "Are they separatists?

    "At this time an argument ensued and both Thondaman and Bandaranike were shouting at each other. After the commotion subsided, Dinesh Gunawardene remarked that during the shouting he had heard Thondaman say that they were the same people who had briefed S D Bandaranaike to ask questions.

    "S D Bandaranaike: "You must name these people. Otherwise resign. You have become president of the TULF now. You have been planted in the cabinet by the Tamil Nadu separatists.

    "Deputy Speaker Norman Waidyaratne stated that "it was up to the minister to divulge the names or not. The House could not compel him.

    "S D Bandaranaike: "What about the pack of lies you told to Indira Gandhi?

    "Thondaman: "The member for Gampaha should withdraw the word 'lies'.

    "S D Bandaranaike: I withdraw the word 'lies'.

    "Thondaman: "You have claimed that it was Sinhalese people who are discriminated against. If that is true, who should be blamed? Do you mean to say successive Sinhalese governments discriminated against the Sinhalese? If so, you should be ashamed of yourself for you too were part of the government." Out of Bondage: The Thondaman Story by T Sabaratnman, pages 137-138.

    On November 7, 1983, J R Jayewardene invited G Parthasarathy to Colombo to resume discussions. He held a series of talks with President Jayewardene, Gamini Dissanayake, and Lalith Athulathmudali. The government offered to strengthen the District Development Council law. Parthsarathy told the Sri Lankan government ministers that it would not satisfy the aspirations of the Tamils, as their demand was for a separate state.

    Parthsarathy continued with his negotiation and the government agreed to accept the merger of two or more District Development Councils within the province, provided that the council members voted for such a merger and the people voted in favor of the merger in the respective council areas in a referendum. The government urged the Tamils to reciprocate by disavowing separation and recognizing that the Trincomalee harbor should be subject to the control of the central government.

    In the meantime, Indira Gandhi invited Amirthalingham to prepare herself for talks with Jayewardene, who was supposed to visit for the Commonwealth Conference to be held in New Delhi. Parthasarathi also met the TULF leaders on November 17 and 18. The TULF leaders reiterated that they were not prepared to give in on two demands: the merger of the North and Eastern Councils into one and a separate police force for the two provinces.

    On November 21, J R Jayewardene flew to New Delhi along with his brother H W Jayewardene to attend the Commonwealth heads of government meeting. This trip was described as a fence-mending trip for Jayewardene to meet with Indira Gandhi, who hosted the Commonwealth Conference. Thondaman also went to New Delhi, at the invitation of Parthsarathy.

    Jayewardene met Indira Gandhi before the conference. She told the Sri Lankan president that India supported the democratically-elected government of Sri Lanka and was completely against the division of the country. She urged him to find a political solution to the problems confronting the Tamils within the country's united framework. She also told him of India's concern - the influx of the Tamil refugees and the strong feelings of the people of Tamil Nadu. Jayewardene in turn spoke of the problem he faced and the fears of the Sinhalese people that Tamils would dominate the country.

    On November 24, Jayewardene delivered a speech at the political committee meeting of the Commonwealth Conference. He said, "If I have the strength to live, I will not let my people be subject to anybody. Fifteen million people will die if an atom bomb is exploded in Sri Lanka; fifteen million people can die if they are invaded by someone else and decide never to give in." In his address, President Jayewardene recalled the meeting he had with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru and showered praises on them both. He said that he was a follower of Mahatma's non-violence and Nehru's non-alignment.

    Thondaman met Indira the next day. He referred to President Jayewardene's speech and told Indira Gandhi, "President Jayewardene praised your father very much. I hope you are pleased."

    Indiria Gandhi said with a spark of anger in her words, "That old man [referring to Jayewardene] was not praising my father, he was telling the world that I am not living up to my father."

    Also his reference about the invasion in his speech was attributed to a rumor that India intended to invade Sri Lanka. Indira Gandhi at a later stage made contemptuous references to Jayewardene, when she met Tamil expatriates in New York. She told them that she would have ordered the invasion of Sri Lanka, but had reservations because of the defenseless nature of the Tamils of Indian origin, who live among the Sinhalese in the Hill country region in Sri Lanka.

    The Commonwealth Conference concluded on November 29, but Jayewardene stayed back in New Delhi. Jayewardene and Indira Gandhi had a long discussion. The discussion was in regard to the famous Annexure C. The document which came to be known as Annexure C was mainly Parthasrathy's distillation of the TULF's demands. Indira Gandhi and Jayewardene failed to agree on one point. Indira Gandhi backed the TULF's demand for the merger of the North and Eastern provinces into a single unit, whereas President Jayewardene opposed it. Jayewardene argued that Muslims and the Sinhalese formed the majority in the Eastern province and he was worried about their future in a merged Northeast province.

    Indira Gandhi met the TULF leaders, Amirthalingham and Sivasithamparam together with Thondaman, to consider the outcome of the discussion she had with Jayewardene. Amirthalingham accepted the solution, but insisted that he could not face the Tamil people if he failed to get the merger of the two provinces.

    Thondaman held a press conference when he returned to Colombo. He announced that the gap between the government and the Tamil position has been narrowed to a single issue - the merger. He said, "This is not a big enough deal to allow our country's future to go into jeopardy. Let us rise above sectarian considerations to solve this issue once and for all."

    Thondaman continued to stress that the TULF leadership must accept the regional council's proposal as the first step. Even if they failed to come to an agreement, negotiation would continue and Parthasarathy would come again. The TULF argued that the North and East were recognized as Tamil-speaking regions and that the use of the Tamil language for administrative purposes and in the courts should be treated as separate single units.

    Thondaman suggested, "Although it may not be ideal at present, I feel that the TULF should accept the solution to the vexed ethnic problem." Thondaman then said that the TULF suffered from two main defects: the lack of negotiating skills and the absence of a single person with the capacity and authority to decide on behalf of all the others. Thondaman said that the TULF leaders were "almost all very good lawyers, but the same cannot be said of their negotiating capacity".

    The formula that was accepted by the TULF took the shape of Annexure C. This was a two-page document that was prepared by G Parthasarathy. It contained the consensus that had emerged during the five-month-long discussions Parthasarathy had had with J R Jayewardene, his ministers, Thondaman, and with the TULF leaders. The document comprised 14 paragraphs and it was agreed that the Sri Lankan government should place the proposal before the all-party conference that was supposed to convene for its discussion and adoption.

    The formula contained in Annexure C provided for the formation of a regional council for the Northern province and another for the Eastern province. The councils would be established by the merger of the district development councils in each of those two provinces. The regional council would be elected and the leader of the party commanding the majority would be appointed as the chief minister for the region by the president. The chief minister was empowered to nominate his regional ministry. While the president and parliament would have overall responsibility for all subjects not transferred to the region, the regional council would enjoy legislative and executive powers in all subjects allocated to it.

    The allocated subjects included the maintenance of internal law and order, the administration of justice, social and economic development, cultural matters and land policy. The regional councils received taxing authority, regional public and police services, and high courts. There would be a national policy for land settlement and laws covering the use of Tamil.

    According to the statement made by the president on December 1, 1983, the following proposals that emerged as a result of the discussions in Colombo and New Delhi conducted by G Parthasarathy are considered Annexure C:

    1. The district development councils (DDCs) in a province are permitted to combine into one or more regional councils, if they so agree, by the decision of the councils and approved by a referendum in that district.

    2. In the case of the district councils in the Northern and Eastern provinces respectively, their union within each province is to be accepted since they are not functioning due to the resignation of a majority of members.

    3. Each region will have a regional council if it is so decided. The convention will be established that the leader of the party that commands a majority in the regional council will be formally appointed by the president as the chief minister of the region.

    4. The president and parliament will continue to have overall responsibility over all subjects not transferred to the regions and generally for all other matters relating to the maintenance of the sovereignty, integrity, unity, security, progress, and development of the republic as a whole.

    5. The legislative power of the region will be vested in the regional councils, which would be empowered to enact laws and exercise executive powers on specified subjects including the maintenance of internal law and order in the region, the administration of justice, social and economic development, cultural matters, and land policy. The list of subjects to be allocated to the regions will be worked out in detail.

    6. The regional councils will also have the power to levy taxes or fees and to mobilize resources through loans, the proceeds of which will be credited to a consolidated fund set up for that particular region to which will also be credited grants, allocations or subventions made by the republic. Financial resources will be apportioned to the regions on the recommendation of a representative finance commission appointed from time to time.

    7. Provisions will be made for setting up high courts in each region. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka will exercise appellate and constitutional jurisdiction.

    8. Each region will have a regional service consisting of: (a) Officers and other public servants of the region, and; (b) Such other officers and public servants who may be seconded to the region. Each region will have a regional public service commission for recruitment and for exercising disciplinary powers relating to the members of the regional service.

    9. The armed forces of Sri Lanka will adequately reflect the national ethnic position. In the Northern and Eastern regions, the police forces for internal security will also reflect the ethnic composition of these regions.

    10. A Port Authority under the central government will be set up for administering Trincomalee port and harbor. The area that will come under the administration of the Port Authority, as well as the powers to be assigned to it, will be further discussed.

    11. A national policy on land settlement and the basis on which the government will undertake land colonization will have to be worked out. All settlement schemes should be based on ethnic proportions so as not to alter the demographic balance subject to agreement being reached on major projects.

    12. The Constitution and other laws dealing with the official Sinhalese language and the national language of Tamil will be accepted and implemented as well as similar laws dealing with the national flag and the anthem.

    13. The conference should appoint a committee to work out constitutional and legal changes that may be necessary in order to implement these decisions. The government would provide a secretariat and the necessary legal offices.

    14. The consensus of opinion in the All Party Conference will itself be considered by the United National Party Executive Committee and presumably by the executive bodies of the other parties as well before being placed before parliament for legislative action.

    J R Jayewardene, after returning from India on December 1, 1983, began to concentrate on arrangements for the All Party Conference. He invited the leaders of political parties such as the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, the Communist Party, Mahajana Eksath Perumuna, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, the Democratic Workers Congress, and the Ceylon Workers Congress and met one-on-one with them. He also invited Buddhist organizations and tried to ascertain from them whether they agreed to his inviting the TULF to the All Party Conference, and a format they could agree on as a solution to the ethnic problem.

    The political parties, including the SLFP, convinced Jayewardene that the TULF had to be invited. Subsequently, the president invited all the recognized political parties for a meeting on December 21. The meeting was about the All Party Conference and the parties were requested to decide on the venue for the subsequent meeting, the parties to be invited, and any other matter that would have to be resolved and adopted. After 90 minutes of discussion, they decided to invite the TULF and to hold the next meeting on January 10, 1984, in Colombo.

    The government handed over a formal invitation to the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Chatwal on December 28. The commissioner in turn flew to Madras and handed over the invitations and connected documents to Amirthalingham. The Indian High Commissioner also held a brief meeting with M Sivasithamparam and Amirthalingham prior to his departure for New Delhi.

    The documents which were delivered to Amirthalingham along with the invitations were: (1) Annexure A, containing five published documents, and; (2) Annexure B, which contained a 14-point peace plan for consideration by the conference. Accordingly, the Annexure B was as follows:

    1. That the demand for a separate state be abandoned.

    2. That mergers of the DDCs within a province be made possible if that is the desire of the councils and is endorsed by the people of the district at a referendum. This principle would be applicable to the whole country.

    3. There will be areas where regional councils are set up to establish the convention that the leader of the party commanding the majority of the council will be formally appointed as chief minister of the region by the president. The chief minister will work with an executive committee set up by him (the chief minister).

    4. The president and parliament will continue to have overall responsibility for all subjects not transferred to the maintenance of the sovereignty, integrity, unity, security, progress, and development of the republic as a whole.

    5. The councils will have power to levy taxes and to raise loans as well as to receive grants and allocation from the central government.

    6. The administration of the port of Trincomalee will remain a central government function.

    7. A high court will function in each region while the Supreme Court will exercise separate and constitutional jurisdiction.

    8. The list of subjects to be allocated to the regional councils will be worked out in detail. The councils will be empowered to exercise executive power in the fields allocated to them.

    9. Those serving in a region or seconded to it will constitute a regional service of public officials.

    10. A regional Public Service Commission will be set up for recruitment and disciplinary matters.

    11. The Public Service of Sri Lanka and the armed services will reflect the country's ethnic composition. Within the region the police service that will be responsible for internal security will reflect the ethnic composition of the region.

    12. A national policy on land settlement will be worked out.

    13. The constitutional provisions and the other laws on the official language (Sinhalese) and the national language (Sinhalese and Tamil) will be accepted and implemented. This will also apply to the laws dealing with the national flag and the national anthem.

    14. There will be united opposition to the use of violence and terrorism to attain political objectives.

    The Presidential Secretariat issued a statement stating that Annexure B with the 14 points would be the basis for a discussion to find a solution to the ethnic conflict on the island. But the TULF was disturbed about Annexure B. On December 30, Amirthalingham told Parthasarathy that President Jayewardene had gone back on his word by placing as the first item in the annexure the subject connected with the abandonment of the demand for Eelam.

    He informed Parthsarathy that the TULF's stand on this matter was very clear. The TULF had said time and again that, they would be able to give up their demand for a separate state for Eelam only in case a viable alternative acceptable to the TULF was offered. He also pointed out that item number two in the annexure, which mentions a referendum, was also objectionable.

    Parthasarathy immediately invited the TULF leaders to come over to New Delhi for further discussions on the matter. On the same day, Amirthalingham and Sivasithamparam went to New Delhi and met Parthasarathy, External Affairs Minister Narasimha Rao, and the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. After the meeting, Indira Gandhi telephoned J R Jayewardene and told him of the genuine concerns of the Tamils and the TULF. She suggested that Parthasarathy visit Colombo for a trouble-shooting engagement. After a discussion with his cabinet of ministers, Jayewardene telephoned Indira Gandhi back, saying that his government favored Parthsarathy's visit to Colombo.

    Parthasarathy consequently arrived in Colombo on January 3, met the president in the evening, and conveyed objections raised by the TULF. He explained to the president that if the Tamils were to give up their demand for a separate state, the government would have to come forward to set up a conducive climate for the safety and security of the Tamil people in the country. He further suggested that such a situation guaranteeing the safety and security of the Tamils could only be guaranteed by creating an autonomous administration through combining the North and Eastern provinces into a single administrative unit. He also said that the government has to ensure the safety and security of the Tamils who live outside those two provinces in the country.

    Jayewardene subsequently agreed with Parthasarathy and an agreement on these subjects was arrived at and circulated as Annexure C - which also came to be known as the Parthasarathy-Jayewardene Proposal. Subsequently, Jayewardene was hesitant to own the proposal as he had not entered his signature. As a result, he even declined to place the proposal for consideration in the forthcoming All Parties Conference. Therefore, Thondaman placed it as his document.

    Meanwhile, on January 3, Amirthalingham, Sivasithamparam, Sampanthan and Thangathurai arrived in Colombo to participate in the All Party Conference. They met Parthasarathy and he advised the TULF leaders to participate in the conference scheduled to be held on January 10 and raise the issues they wanted to raise in the conference for discussion and resolution.

    The Sri Lanka Freedom Party met and decided to seek clarification from Jayewardene regarding the amended Annexure C. The SLFP felt that the president and the UNP were trying to trick them. They were of the opinion that Jayewardene, by disowning a proposal he worked out with Parthasarathy, was so deceptive that he was not only trying to trick Parthasarathy, but also the entire country.

    Subsequently, the SLFP and the MEP boycotted the All Party Conference held at the Bandaranaike International Memorial Conference Hall (BIMCH) on January 10. The president in his address stressed three objectives of the conference: "First, ensuring the sovereignty and independence of the country; second, the continuation of the unitary state and its integrity; and third, working jointly to eliminate all forms of violence."

    On March 20 at the APC meeting, Jayewardene announced that a consensus had been reached on the need for devolution and proposed two committees to be formed, one on devolution and the other on grievances. The committee on devolution was to be headed by R Premadasa and its responsibility was to work out in detail the structures, powers, and functions of the unit of devolution, while the committee on grievances was headed by KW Devanayakam and its responsibility was to consider steps that needed to be implemented in the spheres of education, employment, and language.

    The plenary session of the APC was adjourned until May 9 despite displeasure from the TULF. When Amirthalingham objected to Jayewardene's announcement stating that the TULF was not aware of the arrival of any consensus, Jayewardene's reply was crisp and blunt. He said he had made a decision and that, "My decision is the consensus."

    In the meantime, India took serious note of the developments in Sri Lanka. India had reason to believe that Sri Lanka was trying to seek military assistance from foreign countries other than India. Sri Lanka, in a way, gradually began to launch an anti-Indian campaign, accusing India of playing "big brother" and ridiculing India's claim of regional power.

    Several decisions made by the Sri Lankan government caused great concern and apprehension to the Indian government. They were: the economic use of nearly 99 unused oil tanks in Trincomalee, and; the expansion of existing broadcasting facilities of the Voice of America.

    Trincomalee harbor in the Eastern province is considered a natural harbor and had all the natural facilities to accommodate any large warships and other fleets. This harbor proved to be of immense strategic importance to Great Britain during World War II. The Royal Navy of Great Britain remained and utilized this harbor until 1956. Its strategic location in the Indian Ocean attracted many countries, especially the United States. In 1987, the Sri Lankan government removed a ban on foreign warships calling at the harbor. This enabled the US to send several warships there under several pretexts. By providing such facilities to the Americans, Sri Lanka received several large consignments of arms, ammunition, and other war-related equipment that was supplied through Pakistan, China, Israel, and Singapore.

    In the 1920s, Great Britain constructed a huge oil storage facility in Trincomalee. The facility had around 101 oil tanks with a storage facility of well over 10,000 tons. Ceylon Petroleum owns these storage tanks in China Bay, Trincomalee, which they purchased from the British Admiralty in 1963. The Sri Lankan Petroleum Corporation used only 10 of these tanks for the storage of its refined products. Also, it leased four tanks to the Prima Flour milling complex for the storage of water. The rest of the tanks lay idle. All of the tanks were located on 676 acres of land owned by the Petroleum Corporation.

    Meanwhile, in 1980, an offer was received by the Greater Colombo Economic zone from the HARCO Group Inc, in Florida, for the construction of an oil refinery complex at China Bay, Trincomalee. The project was to establish an oil refinery with the processing capacity of 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day. The Indian government expressed fears about this project. Lalith Athulathmudali explained to India that Sri Lanka was interested in developing Trincomalee on a commercial basis and not on the basis of its strategic location.

    Subsequently, on April 8, 1982, a tender notice appeared in the Daily News that read, "Invitation to offer terms to rehabilitate, develop, market and operate an oil storage complex at China Bay, Trincomalee, Sri Lanka." The Ceylon Petroleum Corporation called for tenders on or before May 3, 1982 and one of the clauses in the tender notices was that, "Oil owned by any military establishment cannot be stored in this tank farm".

    On August 2, 1982, in answer to a question in the Rajya Sabah, the Indian Minister of Petroleum, Chemicals and Fertilizers informed the House that a team of four officers from the Indian Oil Corporation visited Colombo between May 3-7, 1982, and that the Indian Oil Corporation had submitted its offer to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation and that no decision had yet been taken.

    Subsequently, on February 23, 1984, the Sri Lankan government leased the Trincomalee Tank Development Project to an international consortium consisting of three firms: Oroleum (Pvt) Ltd, Oil Tanking, and Tradinfant based in Singapore, West Germany, and Switzerland, respectively. These companies, it seems, were floated in 1982 specifically to obtain this lease. Oroleum (PVT) Ltd was set up by people in the Coastal Corporation in Singapore, an affiliate of the Coastal Corporation in Bermuda that was refused the Trincomalee contract in 1981.

    The tenders for this contract were submitted by several countries, including India, which offered a more profitable proposal. On April 24, 1985, responding to a question in the Rajya Sabah on the status of the global tender, the Minister of State for External Affairs replied that the Indian Oil Corporation had also submitted a tender, and that its tender was fairly competitive, but unfortunately, the contract was allotted to three firms from Singapore for reasons unknown. Oroleum (Pvt) Ltd submitted its tender after the deadline, but won the contract. The contract allowed the company to supply petroleum to foreign warships without the permission of the Sri Lankan government.

    Another matter of contention for India was the Voice of America's relay station. In 1951, the United States of America and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) signed an agreement permitting the US to install shortwave transmitters to be used by the Voice of America (VOA). The agreement had been renewed several times over the years. On August 9, 1983, a revised agreement was signed that was intended to improve the strength of the broadcasting facilities. This agreement raised many questions and many problems, both domestically and externally. The main features of the 1983 Agreement were:

  • The United States Information Agency will construct and operate a receiving and transmitting Voice of America Radio Relay Station;
  • The transmitting station will consist of six shortwave transmitters, of which two shall have the capability to transmit up to 250 kilowatts and four shall have the capability to transmit up to 500 kilowatts; 
  • There will also be associated, receiving, and communication facilities;
  • The US government shall not, to the best of its ability, allow the broadcast of any program detrimental to the national interests of Sri Lanka; 
  • Representatives of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation will have access to the station, and; 

  • The Sri Lankan government will lease or help to acquire 1,000 acres of land for these expanded facilities and the agreement will continue in force for a period of 20 years, renewable in blocks of 10-year extension periods.

    This transmitter center that was to be installed in Sri Lanka was the only one of its kind outside the United States' territory and it was expected to be powerful enough to jam any other broadcast in the region with links to communication satellites. According to the agreement signed on December 10, 1983, the Sri Lankan government on January 15, 1985, handed over nearly 800 acres of land in the village of Thodduwa and 200 acres of land in the village of Iranwila in Nattandiya, located on the Western coast of the island. Further, it was reported that VOA could broadcast low-frequency messages to US nuclear submarines that lie in the canyons beneath the North Indian Ocean without these submarines having to go to the surface to receive these messages.

    The agreement on the Voice of America facilities raised concerns in opposition quarters, in Sri Lanka, in India, and elsewhere. On March 28, 1985, in response to questions in the Indian parliament about whether the VOA transmitters would pose a threat to India's defense communication systems, Minister of State for External Affairs Kurshad Alam Khan said that the relay station was "reportedly the most powerful outside the US and its range is likely to cover the whole of the Indian subcontinent and the neighboring countries". The Soviet Union also reacted strongly to the installation of the powerful VOA transmitters in Sri Lanka.

    Meanwhile, the United States had been showing keen interest in the developments in Sri Lanka and a number of high officials from America visited Colombo in the next two-and-a-half years. US Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger visited Sri Lanka on October 1, 1983, probably in response to a request by the Sri Lankan government for military assistance immediately after the July 1983 violence. Though it was reported that Weinberger was simply stopping over for tea, there was no doubt that military subjects were on the agenda for discussion.

    Following Casper Weinberger's visit, Lieutenant-General Vernon A Walters, the Special Envoy of the American President Ronald Regan, visited Sri Lanka twice, the first time in the latter part of October and again in December 1983. He had the reputation of carrying out sensitive missions for America in other countries, and his visits were always shrouded in great secrecy. Therefore, by the mere fact that he visited a country, his visits always generated great attention. Walters' first visit did little more than develop clearer understanding by giving the Sri Lankan president the narrow limits within which he would have to operate with India.

    "Neither Walters nor J R had any aides with them when they met for their discussions. Walters recalled that he advised the president to continue with his negotiations with the Tamil separatist groups and with India, and also expressed his fears that India might well take stronger measures, a hint of a possible military intervention, if the Sri Lankan situation deteriorated further, by which he appeared to mean further outbreaks of ethnic violence." J R Jayewardene of Sri Lanka: A Political Biography - Volume Two: From 1956 to His Retirement (1989) by KM de Silva and Howard Wriggins, page 581.

    Walters' visit to Sri Lanka duly aroused the ire and anxiety of India, which suspected an anti-Indian conspiracy was in the offing. Also, Walters did not visit India after his visit to Sri Lanka, which further offended the Indians. Subsequently, the Indian Embassy in Washington was informed by the State Department that the visit was "not designed for the purpose of doing anything behind the back of India".

    Walters visited Sri Lanka for a second time from December 9-11, 1983. During that visit, he delivered to President Jayewardene a message from Ronald Regan stressing the need for a political solution to the ethnic conflict. This time, after his visit to Sri Lanka, Walters also visited New Delhi. It was said that the Sri Lankan problem received sufficient interest on the American side for the US administration to have sent Walters to Sri Lanka twice. The visit was seen in Sri Lanka as a great morale booster and also aroused India's suspicion.

    It was reported that Walters urged the Indian government to be more sensitive to the difficulties of its Sri Lankan counterpart. Walters' visit and other influential US officials and legislators' visits to Colombo appeared to have strengthened the Indian suspicions about an unscripted behind-the-scenes role in Sri Lanka. These suspicions became stronger after J R Jayewardene's official visit to Washington in June 1984 at the beginning of Ronald Regan's re-election campaign.

    About Walters' visit, J N Dixit, who was Indian high commissioner in Sri Lanka during the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement period and later secretary to the ministry of external affairs, wrote in his book, Assignment Colombo, as follows:

    "The visits of US General Vernon Walters to Colombo came in October 1983 and then again in 1984. [It has to be December 1983] Walters was a senior figure in the US strategic and intelligence establishment. Walters had followed the first visit to Colombo [it is his second visit to Colombo] with a visit to India also. General Walters was perceived by the Indian establishment as a confirmed Cold War warrior. He was known to be the subterranean architect of many of the anti-Indian aspects of US policies on matters of India's national unity.

    "Walters gave detailed information to Mr Jayewardene about India providing training and other logistical facilities to Sri Lankan Tamil separatists in India. He also agreed to act as an intermediary between Sri Lanka and Israel to ensure Israeli arm supplies and intelligence support to the island nation. The quid pro quo suggested by Walters was that Sri Lanka strategic intelligence gathering facilities against India in the proposed Voice of America broadcasting station be established in that country. Walters also agreed to facilitate the employment of British mercenaries and Pakistani military officers to support and assist Sri Lankan security forces. India had confirmed information about the discussions Walters had on Sri Lanka, both in Colombo and in Washington. This certainly did not improve Mrs Gandhi's mood or attitudes on the Sri Lankan situation." - page 20.

    On January 12, 1984, a six-man delegation led by Joseph Adabbo, chairman of the Defense Appropriation Committee of the US House of Representatives, visited Sri Lanka. After discussions with the government, he announced that he would recommend US$3.5 million be released to Sri Lanka immediately for defense purposes. Adabbo also said that the US would consider Sri Lankan requests for "a military type surface ship" and modern training facilities for the Sri Lankan Navy. Richard Murphy, the US assistant secretary of state for the Near East and Far East, also visited Sri Lanka on October 26, 1984.

    The Sri Lankan government also hired Keeny Meeny Services, a Channel Island-based British mercenary company, to train the Sri Lankan Special Task Force, an elite commando unit under the command of Ravi Jayewardene, the son of the president of Sri Lanka. Also, the former British Special Air Services personnel provided by the company trained police commandos in counterinsurgency methods. British mercenaries from Keeny Meeny Services and British pilots were in Sri Lanka training the dreaded Special Task Force, which was responsible for the killings and involuntary disappearances of thousands of Tamil civilians in the Eastern province.

    The British pilots were seen flying helicopter gunship and air planes to bombard and attack innocent Tamil civilians in the Northern province, especially on the Jaffna Peninsula. These British mercenaries were paid a monthly salary of around 2,500 British pounds per person and other fringe benefits in order to actively participate in killing and maiming innocent Tamil civilians. It was understood that former British Special Air Services personnel did not operate in foreign countries without the tacit approval of the British government. The British government under the stewardship of Margaret Thatcher provided logistical support to the Sri Lankan army in its efforts to suppress the Tamils.

    Sri Lankan Minister for National Security Lalith Athulathmudali admitted at a press conference held in Colombo on August 11, 1984, that the Israel Internal Security Agency Shin Beth was involved in the training of the Sri Lankan armed forces. Many officers belonging to Israel were involved in the training of the Sri Lankan soldiers in Colombo.

    It was learned that in October 1983, Jayewardene decided to seek assistance from Israel and authorized his son Ravi Jayewardene to take on the task. In August 1983, the secretary to the cabinet, G V P Samarasinghe, secretly visited Israel. After subsequent meetings, an agreement was signed by which Israel would loan Sri Lanka a few Shin Beth intelligence officers and Colombo would permit the opening of an Israeli Interests Section in the American Embassy. It was said that Walters played a major role in the drafting of the agreement Sri Lanka signed with Israel in May 1984. In May 1984, J R Jayewardene told the cabinet of the agreement with Israel. The two Muslim ministers in the cabinet, M H Mohamed and A C S Hameed, opposed it while Athulathmudali, Ananda Tissa de Alwis, and Gamini Dissanayake supported it.

    The Israeli Interests Section was opened in the American Embassy on May 24, 1984, and David Matani, the assistant director of the Asian division of Israel's Foreign Ministry who arrived in Sri Lanka in April 1984, took charge of the Interests Section. Later, on October 21, 1984, a senior Israeli diplomat, Agrail Karni, arrived to take charge of the Interests Section. There were reports that even prior to the opening of the Interests Section, Israelis were in Sri Lanka and were involved in the training of the Sri Lankan soldiers. This was confirmed by David Matani before his departure. He said that the Sri Lankan government was in contact with Israel much before the July 1983 violence.

    Pakistan, during the time of General Zia Ul-Haq's tenure of office as president, trained more than 8,000 Sri Lankan troops in counterinsurgency tactics and other basic training. Those trained by the Pakistani armed services wore special black-colored uniforms and these soldiers were responsible for the indiscriminate killings of several thousands of Tamil civilians.

    On March 23, 1984, J R Jayewardene set up the Ministry of National Security and named Lalith Athulathmudali its minister, as well as deputy minister of defense. The Oxford-educated lawyer-turned-politician had earlier held the Ministry of Shipping and Trade portfolio. The new ministry included Ravi Jayewardene, the son of the president, as national security adviser and General Sepala Attygalle as the secretary to the ministry of defense. He was instructed by Jayewardene, the president, to transform the Sri Lankan Army, which was meant earlier only for ceremonial and other limited roles, into a real fighting force.

    When Athulathmudali took charge of the army in 1984, the number of regulars was around 15,000 and volunteers numbered around another 5,000. He began to launch a concerted recruitment drive whereby unemployed village Sinhalese youths, hoodwinked by the government's propaganda drive, began to get themselves enlisted in the Sri Lankan army, becoming cannon fodder in the war. These young youths who joined the army with high hopes and dreams became prey to the false and mischievous policies and programs adopted by the Sinhalese political leaders.

    On the day he took charge, Athulathmudali visited Jaffna for a conference with the army and police officials in the district. Meanwhile, the LTTE raided the Point Pedro Police Station, killing a police sergeant and two police constables. Two days later, a gunman shot and killed a policemen and a member of the air force in two separate incidents in Jaffna. In an attempt to avenge the killing of the air force person, on March 28, 1984, air force personnel arrived in a jeep and a truck in Chunnakam, located six miles away from Jaffna city on the way to Kankesanthurai, and went to the Chunnakam police station. They had discussions with the officer-in-charge of the police station, Police Inspector S Rajalingham. After Rajalingham's tacit approval, it is said, they came out of the police station and started shooting civilians in the Chunnakam market square.

    Chunnakam's weekly market was the biggest and largest vegetable market in the Northern province. Products of the Jaffna farmers, such as red onions, green and dried chilies, tomatoes, bananas, grapes, and other farm products were brought to this market and auctioned. Later they were transported to the markets in Colombo and in other parts of the country. Market days were Monday, Wednesday, and Friday and on those days, farmers from the entire Jaffna district would sell their farm products and buyers from the Jaffna peninsula, as well as from far away places like Galle, Matara, and Hambantota in the South, also came to this market.

    On such a market day, air force personnel, without any provocation, began to spray bullets onto the crowd. This writer, also from Chunnakam, was in the market and a living witness to the atrocities of the air force personnel on that particular day. In the end, a total of nine innocent civilians died due to gunshot injuries. Nearly 50 civilians were wounded and the market-keeper Subramaniam, popularly called Maniam, died of a heart attack inside the market compound.

    Gradually, the situation on the Jaffna peninsula began to grow tense and the Tamil militants who were now armed with weapons given by the RAW of India began to retaliate against each and every revengeful act of the Sri Lankan security forces. The Sri Lankan army, police, and other security forces in the country became more and more communal. They began to perceive the Tamil militancy as a challenge to Sinhalese supremacy in the country, and began to react to the attacks of Tamil militants by inflicting collective punishment on innocent Tamil civilians. The unprofessional behavior of the armed forces and the police was hailed by the political leadership of the country. The government leaders gave their blessing to the undisciplined soldiers and the police to take revenge on unprotected Tamil civilians.

    A whirlpool of violence and counterviolence became the order of the day in the Jaffna peninsula. The Sri Lankan army with the advice, direction, and supervision of the Israeli intelligence agents staged numerous attacks against the Tamils, while the Tamil militants, on the advice, guidance and logistical support of the Indian RAW agents, countered the attacks launched by the Sri Lankan security forces. On April 10, 1984, the LTTE detonated a car near a church in Karaiyoor, Jaffna, when an army convoy passed by. The army truck was thrown 20 meters away into a drain and the dazed soldiers emerged firing at all moving objects. In the meantime, the attackers had quietly disappeared, but the government insisted that there was a running battle between the soldiers and the Tamil militants.

    The Sri Lankan army subsequently shot and killed five civilians and several civilians sustained injuries. Subsequently, on the afternoon of April 10, the Jaffna peninsula came under a curfew. Soldiers went on a rampage in the city, destroying several cars, buses, and buildings in the city. An historic Catholic church in Karaiyoor was severely damaged by security forces.

    This led to violent reactions, with hundreds of civilians taking to the street to protest the damage to the Catholic Church. Meanwhile, a Tamil mob attacked the Buddhist temple located in the Ariyakulam junction in Jaffna. For revenge, they completely destroyed the Buddhist vihare beyond repair. They attacked the Sinhalese school located behind the Jaffna Railway Station, but there were no casualties since the school was closed for holidays. Several Sinhalese-owned shops were also set on fire. This was the first time Tamil militants took revenge on Sinhalese interests on the Jaffna peninsula.

    Meanwhile, on May 10, 1984, a group of 11 armed members of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) barged into the beachside house of American couple Stanley Bryson and Mary Elizabeth Allen, who were working on a US-funded water project in Point Pedro. The two were alleged to be CIA agents and their kidnapping was said to be executed with military precision. They were bound, gagged, blindfolded, and forced into a car, which was later found deserted near the Kankesanthurai beach to give the impression they were being taken to India. On the following day, the People's Liberation Army, the armed wing of the EPRLF, issued a note to the government agent in Jaffna, demanding the release of 20 political prisoners and 50 million rupees worth in gold that would have to be delivered to the Tamil Nadu government by 12 noon on May 14. The note warned that failure to comply would lead to the couple's execution.

    The Indian government was embarrassed over the incident. Abduction took place on the eve of the visit to India of George Bush, the US vice president. The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister disclaimed responsibility for the kidnapping and Mohandas, the Tamil Nadu's director general of police, summoned the EPRLF leaders and demanded the immediate release of the Allens. The RAW threatened to do away with the training program for the EPRLF cadres if the Americans were not freed. Pathmanabah, the secretary general of the EPRLF, was arrested and taken into custody by the Q branch of the Tamil Nadu police. M G Ramachandran, the chief minister, fumed over the incident and said, "I am afraid that the stage may be reached when the militants will lose the sympathy and support of the people of Tamil Nadu."

    Indira Gandhi appealed to the EPRLF to release the Americans immediately. Her message demanding the release of the Allen couple on humanitarian grounds was broadcast over the Tamil service of the All India Radio's Madras station every 30 minutes for about nine hours. In the meantime, Intelligence Bureau officials (IB) handed a typed note from Indira Gandhi to Pathmanabah, which read, "Release the Allen Couple. I will provide all help to you."

    On the evening of the 14th, the Allen couple surfaced before the Bishop of Jaffna. They were brought there by some EPRLF members and handed over to the Bishop. The couple before their departure to United States said, "The abductors said they were not terrorists but freedom fighters. If they were terrorists, they would have killed us." Those were the parting words of the Allens.

    Athulathmudali, when commenting about the kidnapping and release of the Allens, thundered, "Terrorist elements were residing in Tamil Nadu. If there was any doubt earlier, there should be none by now."

    Sri Lankan Prime Minister Premadasa accused India of arming, training, and harboring Tamil militants and of attempting to divide the island republic.

    Courtesy: The Island, October 26, 2001

    NEXT: Chapter 31: Indira Gandhi - causality of terror and violence 
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